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INTRODUCTION 
What is the ideal structure for appellate review? Without 
providing a definitive answer to the question, commentators have 
suggested several factors that may improve the process, and thus 
perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review. First, it is said that panels 
of judges are preferable to review by a single judge. Second, expertise 
in the relevant area of law is a benefit. Third, other indicia of 
lawfinding ability—such as the ability of lawyers and judges to focus 
on legal issues without the distraction of factual conflicts and the 
amenability of judges’ schedules to careful contemplation and 
reflection—contribute to the quality of appellate review. Fourth, a 
court’s adherence to traditional notions of appellate hierarchy, as 
exemplified by following its earlier precedents, has been deemed to 
produce better results. Finally, it is said that the independence of 
appellate judges—that is, the extent to which job features such as life 
tenure and a guaranteed salary tend to insulate judges from pressures 
to decide cases or issues one way or another—is of value. 
In this Article, we endeavor to evaluate empirically the relative 
quality of appellate review. To do this, we rely upon data obtained 
from the appellate review of bankruptcy matters. The current federal 
bankruptcy appellate structure provides an excellent setting in which 
to study appellate review because it offers litigants two paths for 
obtaining appellate review. First, after the bankruptcy judge issues a 
ruling, litigants may have the district court—in the person of a single 
district judge—review that ruling. Alternatively, the parties may 
agree (in circuits that have them) to have the bankruptcy judge’s 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988168
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ruling reviewed by a panel of bankruptcy judges—a so-called 
“bankruptcy appellate panel” or “BAP.” Further appeal in both cases—
whether from the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel—
lies with the proper federal circuit court of appeals. 
We have collected data on affirmance rates in and citation 
rates to appellate bankruptcy opinions. Analyses of the data 
generally—and analyses of the citation data in particular—support 
the notion that BAP decisions in our study are perceived to be of 
greater quality than are district court decisions. First, we find support 
for the proposition that courts of appeals are more likely to uphold 
upon review the conclusions of BAPs than district courts. Second, BAP 
decisions are, with statistical significance, cited more frequently by 
bankruptcy courts, BAPs, federal courts of appeals, and courts in 
other circuits than are district court decisions. Only district courts are 
not more likely to cite BAP decisions than decisions rendered by 
district courts. 
Our findings will be of interest both to theoreticians and 
policymakers. If courts try to reach “correct” decisions, then our 
findings generally buttress the various theories about how to structure 
appellate tribunals so as to maximize the quality of appellate review. 
This, in turn, should guide policymakers in designing appellate 
tribunals and appellate structures in general. In particular, 
multimember tribunals that adhere to traditional notions of appellate 
hierarchy and that have subject-matter expertise in the area of the 
appeal appear to be desirable. And, even if judges do not strive to 
resolve issues and cases “correctly,” our findings still seem to support 
the notion that judges perceive that appellate tribunals that have 
certain attributes will reach correct conclusions. In this sense, our 
findings show the persuasive strength of the theoreticians’ story, or at 
least judges’ perceptions of the strength of that story. 
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides 
an overview of the theoretical literature discussing the quality of 
appellate review. Part II discusses the means by which we undertook 
to evaluate the quality of appellate review: Part II.A presents the legal 
setting of appeals of core bankruptcy proceedings, and Part II.B sets 
out the hypotheses we sought to test. Part III explains how we tested 
the hypotheses. Part III.A details the data we compiled and the 
essential features of those data. The next two subparts present the 
findings of our statistical analyses, with Part III.B explicating the 
bivariate descriptive statistics and Part III.C presenting the results of 
regression tests we conducted. Part III.D interprets these results and 
considers the implications of our findings. 
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I. EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Assembling an exhaustive list of the ideal elements of appellate 
review would present no small task. However, the academic literature 
does suggest several attributes that will tend to contribute to better 
appellate review. 
First, commentators laud the use of panels of judges, rather 
than single judges, to hear appeals. There are two justifications for 
this. First, to the extent that there is an objectively “correct” answer to 
a question of law posed on appeal, and to the extent that there is a 
greater than 50% chance that each appellate judge will reach that 
“correct” answer, the Condorcet Jury Theorem instructs that a panel 
of judges will more likely reach the “correct” answer than will a single 
appellate judge.1 Second, even to the extent that one might question 
the validity of the assumptions underlying the applicability of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate review,2 there is 
an argument that the collegial nature of multimember appellate 
panels contributes to reflective decisionmaking and thus to the quality 
of appellate review.3 
A second factor that strengthens the quality of appellate review 
is expertise of the appellate decisionmaking body in the subject matter 
of the appeals it hears.4 Thus, for example, Congress created the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with an eye to 
 
 1. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ 
Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022–23 (2004) (describing the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem). 
 2. See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for 
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 112–13 & 112 nn.130–31 (2003) (questioning the 
applicability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate judicial decisionmaking). 
 3. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2003) (arguing that collegiality contributes to sound decisionmaking 
that focuses on the legal issues at hand); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking 
the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 100–02 (1986). But see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that 
judges on an appellate panel of the same political party are more likely to vote ideologically); 
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts 
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 316–25 (2004) (finding some 
evidence of ideological voting on federal courts of appeals). 
 4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 
115 (1997) (“Specialization offers two major advantages: expertise and uniformity.”). For an 
argument that it might benefit the legal system to have some judges with expertise in areas 
other than law, see Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 
1587–98 (2007). 
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creating an appellate body with the expertise to deal effectively with 
the complex area of patent law.5 
Third, courts and commentators identify general “lawfinding 
ability”—as distinct from expertise in particular areas of law—as a 
virtue for appellate review.6 While the Supreme Court has 
characterized the presence of multijudge panels as “[p]erhaps most 
important” in assessing lawfinding ability,7 it has also indicated other 
factors that tend to enhance lawfinding ability in the appellate 
setting. Specifically, lawfinding ability is greater when (i) the judges 
have schedules that allow time for reflection,8 (ii) the judges resolve 
legal issues once the factual record is fully developed,9 and (iii) the 
attorneys may focus on the relevant legal issues without the 
distraction of trial advocacy.10 
A fourth factor that tends to be associated with the quality of 
appellate review is the extent to which an appellate court conforms to 
traditional appellate hierarchy.11 Courts in the United States are 
organized according to a standard hierarchy: trial courts decide cases 
in the first instance, with a first appeal as of right to an intermediate 
appellate court and a second appeal to a high court at the discretion of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (citing predictability and efficiency as reasons for creating a 
specialized patent court to relieve the burden of technical patent cases on generalist judges); R. 
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of 
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114–17 (2004) (giving an account of the 
establishment of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent law). 
 6. See Nash, supra note 1, at 1022. 
 7. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991). 
 8. Id. at 231 (noting, with a negative connotation from the perspective of lawfinding 
ability, that district judges “preside alone over fast-paced trials”). 
 9. Id. at 232. 
 10. Id. at 231–32. 
 11. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2047 (2004) (suggesting that appellate review and 
appellate hierarchy are integrally related by noting that “the various characteristics and 
functions of appellate review . . . suggest that some gradation of judicial authority is central to 
the nature of appellate review,” and that “[a]n appellate system of review . . . is one defined by 
hierarchy”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 998 (2002) (“[T]he development of an 
appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher levels and stringent rules of vertical stare 
decisis operates structurally to ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions alone, 
inflict too much damage on the judiciary by making aberrant or overly ambitious decisions.”); 
Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 67, 68 (2006) (“The essence of the American system of precedent as experienced in 
practice resides in the great authority and hierarchical arrangement of the courts.”). But cf. 
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 387–88 (2007) (arguing that the 
common principal-agent model for analyzing lower court efforts to fulfill appellate court 
mandates ignores the allocation of discretion to lower courts). 
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that high court.12 Within that hierarchy are rules of precedent that, 
while not absolute, create barriers against courts overruling earlier 
cases. As a general matter, under so-called horizontal stare decisis, 
high courts and intermediate appellate courts will follow their own 
earlier precedents.13 Further, vertical stare decisis binds inferior 
courts generally to the precedents issued by superior courts within the 
hierarchy.14 
It is true that court systems need not have the features of 
appellate hierarchy and stare decisis to function, nor indeed to 
function well.15 Commentators debate whether Congress can 
statutorily alter or abrogate the traditional rules of stare decisis, as 
 
 12. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: 
Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 (1995) 
(elucidating the traditional appellate hierarchy). 
 13. Absent en banc review, courts of appeals are bound by prior decisions issued by the 
court (independent of panel composition). E.g., United States v. Myers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th 
Cir. 2000).  
 In general, horizontal stare decisis does not extend beyond the court that issued an opinion to 
sibling courts of the same hierarchical level. While intermediate appellate courts will follow 
decisions issued by earlier panels of the same court—notwithstanding that the composition of the 
judges on the panels may vary—intermediate appellate courts generally are under no 
precedential obligation to follow decisions issued by sibling intermediate appellate courts of 
similar hierarchical rank. Thus, for example, a Ninth Circuit panel may find First Circuit 
precedent to be persuasive and choose to follow it, but stare decisis does not demand that the 
Ninth Circuit so act; rather, stare decisis leaves the Ninth Circuit free to disagree with and to 
disregard the First Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824–25 (1994). Also, the rule of 
horizontal precedent does not extend to trial courts, as discussed below. See Amy Coney Barrett, 
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003); Caminker, supra, at 825 
(“[A] district court judge may ignore the decisions of ‘foreign’ courts of appeals as well as other 
district court judges, even within the same district.” (footnote omitted)); Kornhauser, supra note 
12, at 1609. But see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1095 (1994) (noting a “long tradition” of district judges 
deviating from prior precedent in the same district only in extraordinary circumstances); infra 
note 71 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (“[C]ourts generally issue written decisions 
that, when published, have precedential effect on future rulings involving different parties.”); 
Susan B. Haire, Stefanie Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the 
Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 145 (2003) (“Appellate 
oversight in the lower tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy . . . provides a process through which 
circuit judges are expected to promote legal rules that will guide decision making in subsequent 
cases.”); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609. 
 15. For example, civil law systems do not rely upon as stringent a hierarchy, or upon rules 
of precedent as stringent. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 826; Kornhauser, supra note 12, 
at 1608; Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 
211, 214 (1998) (reviewing INTERPRETIVE PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997)) (“One of the classic differences between civil-law 
and common-law jurisdictions is that the former . . . do not recognize judicial precedent as an 
independent source of law.” (footnote omitted)). For an exposition, and critique, of the necessity 
and desirability of stare decisis, see Caminker, supra note 13, at 865–67. 
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well as the normative question of whether it should.16 Nonetheless, 
whether it is constitutionally mandated or normatively desirable, the 
assumption underlying the dominant U.S. judicial structure is that 
horizontal and vertical stare decisis provide precedential power to 
decisions by appellate courts. Assuming that judges seek to arrive at 
correct outcomes,17 these standard rules of precedent presumably 
increase the quality of appellate review. It stands to reason that a 
court that knows that its opinions will bind itself, and possibly bind 
lower courts, will consider more carefully its reasoning before issuing 
judgments and opinions that announce new rules of law.18 Relatedly, a 
focus on cases that raise novel legal questions should allow appellate 
courts to conserve judicial resources, apply those resources in cases in 
which they are truly needed, and thus to reach correct answers more 
frequently.19 
 
 16. Compare, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 828–34 (arguing that the constitutional case 
for the binding nature of Supreme Court precedent on lower federal courts is “quite powerful”), 
and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577–85 (2001) (arguing in favor of the constitutional status 
of stare decisis), with John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 503, 513 (2000) (arguing to the contrary), Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional 
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 92 (2001) (same), Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: 
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 204–07 (2001) 
(same), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove 
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1546–47 (2000) (same). 
 17. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing 
economic theory of stare decisis that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to answer the expected number of 
‘correct’ answers subject to its resource constraint”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and 
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746–47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an 
“interpretive community” that subscribes to the rule of law). 
 Even if goals other than arriving at the correct outcome motivate judges, see, e.g., Erin 
O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare 
Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 738–42 (1993) (arguing that judges’ self-interest—including 
judges’ interest in expanding their influence—explains the development of horizontal stare 
decisis); infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text, the fact remains that, to the extent that the 
U.S. judicial system substantially relies on the traditional hierarchical form and rules, the extent 
to which a court comports with that norm will increase the perception that it is reaching correct 
decisions. 
 18. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1623 (“In a completely decentralized system each 
judge would have to attend to the caseload of every other judge in order to identify appropriate 
cases for review; in a hierarchical system, only the appellate judges need have a systemic 
perspective on caseload.”); cf. id. at 1620 (noting that, absent horizontal precedent, “each judge is 
more likely to give each case intensive consideration” (emphasis added)); id. at 1624 (arguing in 
favor of “strict vertical precedent because the hierarchical structure creates a division of labor 
between levels of the hierarchy”); id. at 1625–27 (arguing in favor of horizontal precedent at the 
appellate, but not the trial, level). 
 19. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1622–24; Caminker, supra note 13, at 839–43. Of 
course, a cost in such a system is that the first court may resolve the legal question incorrectly, 
and then bind future courts to that rule. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 736 n.3 (identifying the 
“primary social cost of stare decisis” as “the entrenchment of bad decisions”); see also Lewis A. 
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A fifth factor that many commentators identify as an 
ingredient of judicial quality is judicial independence.20 It is said that 
judges who enjoy greater independence are less likely to be swayed by 
irrelevant, nonjudicial concerns. The American Founding Fathers 
subscribed to this view,21 and accordingly vested Article III judges 
with presumptive life tenure and the guarantee of nonreduction in 
salary.22 
II. INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND 
THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
At its essence, an appeal involves a claim that a trial court 
committed some form of error—for example, failure to follow proper 
procedure or improper application of the law. Accordingly, we might 
say that one of the primary functions of an appellate court, if not the 
principal function, is to ascertain whether the alleged error truly 
occurred. As we have already discussed, theorists have posited various 
attributes that improve the quality of appellate review. While 
plausible that some of these factors may contribute more than others 
to improving the quality of appellate review, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, on balance, as between two different appellate 
tribunals, the one that has more of the theorized features of quality 
appellate review will perform the appellate function better. 
 
Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 67–73 (1989) 
(discussing reliance by a court on earlier decisions by that court, even if wrongly decided, as an 
optimization problem and as varying depending upon institutional structure). 
 There are other social benefits that rules of stare decisis provide—certainty, predictability, 
fairness, and consistency. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 843–56 (discussing the desire to avoid 
“delayed justice,” the greater decisionmaking proficiency of superior courts, and uniform 
interpretation and application of law as consequentialist justifications for stare decisis); 
Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 74–78 (discussing fairness, competence, and certainty as 
justifications for stare decisis). These benefits, however, are not the result of the courts 
necessarily reaching correct conclusions. Indeed, these benefits would inhere if courts uniformly 
reached bad decisions. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 3, at 105 (contrasting consistency, 
soundness, and coherence). 
 20. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on 
Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 399, 422–24 (2006) (finding a strong 
correlation between judicial independence and court quality); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging 
Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171 (2006) (characterizing judicial independence and judicial 
accountability as “competing demands upon the judiciary”). But see Daniel M. Klerman, Legal 
Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development 1 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. C06-1, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490 (“There is some evidence that judicial independence is 
associated with economic growth, but the evidence is mixed and causation is unclear.”). 
 21. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, 81 (Alexander Hamilton); id. NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James 
Madison). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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The two-tiered system of bankruptcy appeals is an excellent 
field for an empirical investigation of how alternative appellate 
structures may affect the quality of appellate review. The current 
appellate structure provides for appeals of bankruptcy court decisions 
in “core” bankruptcy proceedings to be heard by one of two appellate 
tribunals: federal district courts or federal bankruptcy appellate 
panels (commonly referred to as “BAPs”). Based on the criteria we 
identified above in Part I, we conclude that the BAP is the stronger of 
the two appellate courts—that is, better equipped to carry out the 
principal function of identifying alleged error. We investigate this 
hypothesis through the study of appeals in core bankruptcy 
proceedings. We seek to unearth evidence that will inform scholarly 
inquiry into the hallmarks of quality appellate review and that will 
illuminate areas warranting further exploration. 
This Part sets the backdrop for our empirical study. First, we 
describe the bankruptcy judicial structure, with primary emphasis on 
the manner in which appeals progress through it. We then discuss our 
approach for empirically investigating the theoretical proposition that 
BAPs are the stronger of the two appellate courts in performing 
appellate function at the first tier of review. We finally develop a 
series of hypotheses to test the theory. 
A. The Bankruptcy Appellate Process 
Unlike any other part of the federal judicial system, the 
bankruptcy appeals process routinely involves two levels of 
intermediate review. This anomalous state of affairs can be traced to 
congressional reform efforts during the 1970s that sought to improve 
the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining 
it in a subordinate relationship to the district court.23 
Under the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,24 district courts delegated much of their 
responsibility over bankruptcy cases to “bankruptcy referees,” 
individuals appointed by a panel of district judges for a six-year 
term.25 The limited role and status of the referees at the inception of 
the Bankruptcy Act expanded over time, which in turn increased the 
cadre of full-time judicial officers involved in the administration of 
 
 23. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 47, 123 (1997) (noting that the “double appeal system was a concession to the 
federal judges, a symbol of the subordination of the bankruptcy court to the district court”). 
 24. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 25. Posner, supra note 23, at 61–62. 
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bankruptcy cases.26 Eventually, the Supreme Court promulgated rules 
of bankruptcy procedure in 1973 that redesignated referees as 
“bankruptcy judges.”27 This change, however, did not remove the 
distinction between bankruptcy judges and Article III judges, 
including, for example, “prohibitions against bankruptcy judges using 
the elevators, parking lots, and dining rooms reserved for Article III 
judges.”28 Moreover, some Article III judges continued to refer to 
bankruptcy judges as “referees” in spite of the titular change.29 
Sentiments such as these infused their way into the policymaking 
debates over bankruptcy reform in the 1970s. 
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to analyze the Bankruptcy Act 
and to suggest recommendations for its reform.30 While the original 
resolution creating the Commission proposed that the Chief Justice 
would appoint two bankruptcy referees as commissioners, strident 
opposition—led by, among others, District Judge Edward Weinfeld, 
chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Administration of 
the Bankruptcy System—resulted in passage of the resolution without 
constraints on whom the Chief Justice could appoint.31 The Chief 
Justice did not appoint any bankruptcy referees to the Commission, 
instead appointing Judge Weinfeld and District Judge Hubert Will.32 
Judge Weinfeld’s efforts resulted in the exclusion of bankruptcy 
referees from policymaking discussions on bankruptcy reform within 
the organizational framework of both the Commission and the Judicial 
Conference.33 That the federal judiciary went to great lengths to 
oppose the inclusion of bankruptcy referees in the reform process 
highly suggests that Article III judges feared loss of power and 
prestige in the event Congress increased the power of bankruptcy 
 
 26. See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress and the Passage of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978: Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3–6 (2007). 
 27. BANKR. R. 901(7) (1973) (repealed 1978). 
 28. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the 
Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985). Hearsay 
evidence suggests that at least one Article III judge viewed bankruptcy judges as occupying the 
professional status equivalent to a janitor. See Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34. 
 29. Posner, supra note 23, at 61 & n.25; cf. Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“As late as 
1978, even though Judge James Browning, then chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, specifically 
invited five bankruptcy judges to attend the circuit conference, Senior District Judge Lloyd 
George (formerly a bankruptcy judge) reports that ‘they wouldn’t call me “judge.” They called me 
mister.’ ” (quoting Interview with Lloyd George (Dec. 20, 2004))). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). 
 31. Mund, supra note 26, at 7. 
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Id. 
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referees.34 It is this dynamic that underlies the current bankruptcy 
judicial structure and the anomaly of double appeals. Only one level of 
intermediate appellate review would have been needed had Congress 
made today’s bankruptcy judges coequals with district court judges, 
but that was not to be the case. 
With enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,35 Congress 
effectuated a complete overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system that 
had been in place for eighty years. While there were proposals to vest 
bankruptcy judges with Article III status,36 Congress ultimately 
rejected that notion, a decision supported by most current and former 
Article III judges.37 Congress instead decided to establish the 
bankruptcy courts as “adjuncts” of the federal district courts. 
Bankruptcy jurisdiction was vested statutorily in the district courts, 
yet the statute also directed that all of that jurisdiction was to be 
exercised by the bankruptcy courts, which were to be staffed by non-
Article III judges.38 
The Supreme Court rejected the 1978 Act’s jurisdictional 
structure in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co.39 The Court in Marathon held that the 1978 Act violated 
Article III by vesting federal judicial power in non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges. The decision forced Congress to repair the 
constitutional infirmity. Lobbying by Article III judges led Congress 
yet again to reject a solution of affording bankruptcy judges Article III 
status.40 Instead, Congress simply modified the 1978 structure. The 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 
 
 34. See Posner, supra note 23, at 75. 
 35. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 36. See Countryman, supra note 28, at 7–8. 
 37. See id. at 8–9; Posner, supra note 23, at 77 (“The federal judges opposed the creation of 
more independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment power over 
bankruptcy judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities, and (2) their status 
would be diluted through the vast increase in the number of federal judicial positions.”). 
 Interestingly, as Congress considered various proposals for reorganizing the court structure 
of the bankruptcy system in its reform efforts from the 1970s that led to enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges did not seek Article III status. Instead, they lobbied 
Congress for appointment by the judicial council, rather than the president, for two reasons: 
First, they believed their merit would be properly recognized in a nonpolitical judicial 
appointment process; and, second, they feared that sitting judges would lack the political 
connections necessary for presidential appointment. See Mund, supra note 26, at 20–21, 24–25, 
29. For a political economic analysis of the 1978 Act’s treatment of bankruptcy judges, see 
Posner, supra note 23, at 74–94. 
 38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), (c) (Supp. II 1978), invalidated by N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 39. 458 U.S. at 87. 
 40. Countryman, supra note 28, at 31. 
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statutorily established the bankruptcy judges, who are appointed by 
the courts of appeals,41 as “unit[s]” of the district courts.42 Thus, 
parties technically should file bankruptcy cases in federal district 
court. However, the Act authorizes each district court to “refer” “any 
or all cases” or “proceedings” to the bankruptcy judges.43 District 
courts in turn have implemented “standing orders” to refer 
bankruptcy cases in the first instance to the bankruptcy courts.44 
In determining the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s authority to 
resolve a dispute within a bankruptcy case,45 it is necessary to 
categorize the proceeding as core or non-core. Absent the consent of all 
parties, bankruptcy judges may only issue recommendations for the 
resolution of non-core proceedings, with de novo district court review 
upon objection by either party.46 Appellate review thereafter lies to the 
appropriate federal court of appeals,47 and thence to the Supreme 
Court,48 in line with the typical federal appellate hierarchy. 
Core proceedings, on the other hand, are those that lie at the 
heart of a bankruptcy case.49 Bankruptcy judges are empowered to 
 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005). 
 42. Id. § 151 (2000); see also id. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (“Bankruptcy judges shall serve 
as judicial officers of the United States district court established under Article III of the 
Constitution.”). 
 43. Id. § 157(a) (2000). 
 44. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 731 (2008); Bussel, supra note 13, at 1066 & n.12. 
 45. Disputes in bankruptcy cases generally assume one of two forms: (1) an adversary 
proceeding, or (2) a contested matter. Adversary proceedings include, for example, a proceeding 
to recover money or property; a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien; 
a proceeding to object to or revoke a discharge; and a proceeding to determine the 
dischargeability of a debt. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. Such proceedings are initiated and advance 
much as any other federal lawsuit, insofar as Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, which governs such proceedings, virtually incorporates the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (occasionally with modification). See, e.g., id. 7003 (FED. R. CIV. P. 3); id. 7004(a) 
(portions of FED. R. CIV. P. 4); id. 7005 (FED. R. CIV. P. 5); id. 7012(b) (FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)–(h)); 
id. 7013 (FED. R. CIV. P. 13); id. 7014 (FED. R. CIV. P. 14); id. 7056 (FED. R. CIV. P. 56). Disputes 
between parties that are not adversary proceedings are called “contested matters,” and they 
proceed according to less complex procedures than adversary proceedings—including request for 
relief by motion rather than the filing of a complaint. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014; see also 
Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“In a 
contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims 
and third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or 
dispensed with in the interest of time . . . .”). 
 46. The Judicial Code describes a non-core proceeding as “a proceeding that is not a core 
proceeding but is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 
V 2005). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2000). 
 48. Id. § 1254(1). 
 49. Section 157(b)(1) of the Judicial Code speaks of “core proceedings arising under title 11, 
or arising in a case under title 11.” Id. § 157(b)(1). In turn, section 157(b)(2) lists examples of core 
proceedings, which include matters concerning (1) administration of the estate, (2) the allowance 
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resolve these cases definitively, in the first instance, with appellate 
review to follow.50 Here, however, there may be more than one possible 
appellate path. 
The statute authorizes the judicial council of each circuit to 
establish a “bankruptcy appellate panel”—commonly known as a 
“BAP”—comprised of bankruptcy judges from that circuit.51 BAPs are 
now constituted—and have been constituted since 1996—in the First, 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.52 For a BAP to be 
empowered to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts in a given district, 
a majority of district judges in the district must vote to authorize it.53 
In circuits that have created BAPs and in districts that have 
authorized the BAP to hear appeals, the default rule is that, unless a 
party elects otherwise, appeals of bankruptcy judges’ rulings in core 
proceedings will lie to the BAP.54 Appeals from BAP rulings lie to the 
 
of claims, (3) objections to discharge, and (4) plan confirmation. Id. § 157(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 
2005). 
 50. Id. § 157(b)(1) (2000). Unless, that is, the district court withdraws the reference to the 
bankruptcy court. Id. § 157(d). In that case, the district court hears the matter in the first 
instance, with appeals in the ordinary course lying to the court of appeals and then the Supreme 
Court. See supra notes 47–48. 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The statute also authorizes the creation of intercircuit BAPs, id. 
§ 158(b)(4), but none has yet been created. Much as the bankruptcy court is a unit of the district 
court, the bankruptcy appellate panel may be seen as “a unit of the federal courts of appeals.” 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Federal Judiciary—United States Courts of Appeals, 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals/bap.html (last visited Oct. 
11, 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (requiring BAPs to be established and BAP judges to be 
appointed by the circuit judicial council); B.A.P. 8TH CIR. R. 8016A(a)(1) (“The Clerk of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit shall serve as the Clerk of the United 
States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit.”). Compare Coyne v. Westinghouse 
Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614, 620–21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) 
(describing BAP as unit of the circuit court), with Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, 
Are BAP Decisions Binding on Any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189, 197 (1990) (describing BAP as 
unit of the district court). 
 52. The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were designed to encourage circuit 
courts to create BAPs by directing that each circuit “shall establish” a BAP unless the circuit 
judicial council finds that existing judicial resources are insufficient to establish one or that its 
establishment would result in undue delay or increased cost to parties in cases under the 
Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The six regional circuits that voted against establishing 
BAPs “concluded that the appellate process was functioning well as already constituted and that 
BAPs would create undue delay or increase the cost of appeals.” Henry J. Boroff, The 
Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. L.J. 212, 214 n.10 (1998) 
(citing Elizabeth Abbott, Bankruptcy Review Panel Makes Debut, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at 
B1). For a historical discussion of BAPs, see Bryan T. Camp, Bound by the BAP: The Stare 
Decisis Effects of BAP Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1648–60 (1997); infra note 75. 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). In the mid-1990s, when a Second Circuit BAP was in existence, 
“only three districts participate[d]—and these together typically receive[d] less than a third of all 
bankruptcy petitions filed in the Second Circuit.” Camp, supra note 52, at 1660. These facts, 
presumably, played a large role in the ultimate decision to disband the Second Circuit BAP. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
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circuit courts of appeals.55 Parties may seek discretionary review by 
the Supreme Court of rulings by the courts of appeals.56 
If either the appellant or the appellee so elects—or if the circuit 
has not created a BAP or, even if it has, if the district court in 
question has not voted to authorize BAP appeals—then the district 
court (in the person of a single district judge) initially hears appeals of 
bankruptcy court rulings in core proceedings.57 The judgment of the 
district court may then be appealed to the appropriate circuit court of 
appeals,58 with discretionary Supreme Court review as the remaining 
appellate step.59 In short, then, certain parties in some circuits have 
an option between two possible appellate paths.60 We illustrate this in 
Figure 1.61 
 
 55. Id. § 158(d)(1) (Supp. V 2005). 
 56. Id. § 1254(1) (2000). 
 57. Id. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 58. Id. § 158(d)(1) (Supp. V 2005). 
 59. Id. § 1254(1) (2000). 
 60. See generally Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation 
in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483, 490–500 (elucidating the differences between the 
standard federal judicial hierarchy and the bankruptcy appellate system). 
 61. We should note that a third possible appellate path not yet discussed—that of direct 
appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals—exists for a limited set of 
circumstances. By virtue of amendment to the Judicial Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, appeal may 
proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification procedure if one of the 
following circumstances exists: (1) the appeal involves a question of law unresolved by the court 
of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public 
importance; (3) the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions; 
or (4) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the 
appeal is taken. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2005). 
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FIGURE 1  
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE 
FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A comparison of BAPs to district courts suggests that BAPs 
have more of the features of quality appellate review than do the 
district courts. First, bankruptcy appellate panels are collegial bodies 
that decide cases in three-judge panels. Indeed, bankruptcy judges 
who serve on BAPs themselves believe that reviewing cases in panels 
of judges benefits decisionmaking.62 By contrast, bankruptcy appeals 
to district courts are heard by a single district judge. 
Second, the bankruptcy judges who comprise bankruptcy 
appellate panels are (by virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy 
 
 62. Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 47 B.C. 
L. REV. 105, 123 (2005). 
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judges) presumably experts in bankruptcy law.63 Thus, they are well 
suited to resolve legal issues that might arise in core bankruptcy 
proceedings.64 District judges, by contrast, are more often 
characterized as generalists in the law, without special training or 
experience in bankruptcy law.65 
The third factor—“other” lawfinding ability66—appears to favor 
neither district judges nor bankruptcy appellate panels. Attorneys 
filing appellate briefs may focus on the legal issues without the 
distractions of trial advocacy, whether the briefs are filed with the 
district court or appellate panel. Similarly, both district judges and 
bankruptcy appellate panels hear legal issues once a factual record 
has been established. Last, while district judges and bankruptcy 
judges both preside over trials, neither the district judge hearing a 
bankruptcy appeal, nor bankruptcy judges sitting on a bankruptcy 
appellate panel, are presiding over a trial as part of the appellate 
process.67 
 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy practitioners in 
their prior careers.”); see also id. at 123 (noting that, of a random survey of bankruptcy judges in 
2005, “[a]bout 83% . . . were bankruptcy practitioners before taking the bankruptcy bench,” and 
that, “[o]f the 17% . . . who were not bankruptcy practitioners, almost all came from a business 
law background, as commercial litigators or corporate transactional lawyers,” and further noting 
that the surveyed bankruptcy judges felt that their prior experience was very helpful on the 
bench); cf. id. at 113–16 (discussing the trend among bankruptcy judges to hire more permanent, 
as opposed to term, law clerks, and noting that those bankruptcy judges who preferred 
permanent clerks often hired clerks with legal experience, and in particular practice experience 
in bankruptcy law). 
 64. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“[T]he BAP is desirable because it allows 
specialist bankruptcy judges to replace nonspecialist federal district court judges.”); see also 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230–31 (2006) (reporting empirical finding that bankruptcy judges as 
specialized actors perform “at least as well” as generalist judges in terms of not exhibiting typical 
biases often reflected in judgments). 
 65. One might argue that even district judges with no experience in bankruptcy before 
ascending to the bench gain some experience by virtue of hearing a steady stream of bankruptcy 
cases. A study by the Federal Judicial Center of the bankruptcy appellate structure, however, 
reached the opposite conclusion, observing that “[t]he number of first-level reviewers greatly 
exceeds the number of bankruptcy judges producing the judgments reviewed, and appellate 
caseloads are spread thinly among district judges, giving few judges much opportunity to develop 
bankruptcy expertise.” Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for 
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 627 (2002). 
 66. We employ the modifier “other” because, as noted above, the Court suggested that the 
use of multi-judge panels is “[p]erhaps most important” in assessing lawfinding ability. Supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. 
 67. It is this factor that, presumably, vests district judges with lawfinding ability when they 
sit by designation on court of appeals panels. See Nash, supra note 1, at 1031 (explaining that 
the better term is lawfinding “ability” and not lawfinding “expertise”). One might argue that 
lawfinding ability is enhanced to the extent that the judge (whether district or bankruptcy) 
enjoys relief from her other responsibilities while hearing appeals. This seems not to be the case, 
however, at least for bankruptcy judges:  
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Fourth, bankruptcy appellate panels conform to traditional 
notions of appellate review: their rulings are generally seen to be 
binding on future bankruptcy appellate panels drawn from the same 
circuit.68 Further, at least one BAP has held that its decisions are 
binding on all bankruptcy courts within that circuit,69 even if the 
bankruptcy courts themselves do not share this view.70 In contrast, 
 
When asked how BAP service affects their service as a bankruptcy judge, 
several of the [surveyed bankruptcy judges] indicated that it required 
adjustments to their bankruptcy court trial and hearing schedule and that it 
substantially added to their workload. Some of the Survey Participants 
suggested that those bankruptcy judges who serve full-time on the BAP 
should have the option of employing an additional law clerk. One Survey 
Participant indicated that service on the BAP was “like having a second job.” 
Mabey, supra note 62, at 122 (footnote omitted); see also Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the 
Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1330 
(1993) (“The fundamental truth which is the basis for this article is that the bankruptcy caseload 
in many districts in this country is so overwhelming that the bankruptcy judges are sorely 
pressed in the struggle to cope with it.”). 
 68. BAPs in three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth—have reached this conclusion. 
E.g., Concannon v. Imperial Cap. Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 95 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) 
(reaffirming that the BAP will not overrule its prior rulings unless an intervening circuit court or 
Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation, undermines those rulings); Salomon N. Am. 
v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave), 328 B.R. 176, 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (same); Blagg v. Miller 
(In re Blagg), 223 B.R. 795, 804 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (“Our decision is dictated by the principle 
that we are bound by prior panel decisions. A panel cannot overrule the judgment of another 
panel of the court.”), appeal dismissed, 198 F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 1999); Smolen v. Hatley (In re 
Hatley), 227 B.R. 757, 761 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (same), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 1999); 
Luedtke v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Co. (In re Luedtke), 215 B.R. 390, 391 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) 
(relying on circuit court precedent that circuit court panel decisions bind subsequent circuit court 
panels to announce rule that BAP decisions bind subsequent BAP panels); Ball v. Payco-Gen. 
Am. Credits, Inc. (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595, 597 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“We will not overrule our 
prior rulings unless a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Supreme Court decision or 
subsequent legislation has undermined those rulings.”). 
 69. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot (In re Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876, 879 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1992) (“[B]AP decisions originating in any district in the Ninth Circuit are binding precedent 
on all bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit in the absence of contrary authority from the 
district court for the district in which the bankruptcy court sits.”); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70 
B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 70. Compare, e.g., Ore. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 B.R. 
59, 62 (D. Ore. 1990) (stating that BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in the 
district out of which the appeal arose), with Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 
255 B.R. 267, 273 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (rejecting argument that substantial motivation of 
Congress in creating BAPs was to generate a uniform body of bankruptcy law within the circuits, 
concluding that there is no principled reason why decisions of a BAP should have more 
precedential authority than those of district courts, and finding it odd and unseemly, if not 
unconstitutional, for a BAP—comprised of three non-Article III judges—to be generating for 
bankruptcy judges, and perhaps also for district judges, the law of the circuit until the circuit 
court had spoken), In re Virden, 279 B.R. 401, 409 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (quoting In re 
Carrozzella, 255 B.R. at 272-73), and Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 
672, 676–80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that BAPs bind bankruptcy courts on matters 
arising in core proceedings even though district courts do not), aff’d on other grounds, 99 F.3d 
1520 (9th Cir. 1996). For further discussion regarding the precedential effect of BAP decisions, 
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one district judge is generally not bound to follow the ruling of another 
district judge—even one in the same district—on matters of 
bankruptcy or otherwise.71 And bankruptcy courts have held that they 
are not bound by the holding of a single district judge on a multijudge 
district court.72 Therefore, BAPs comport more with the standard 
model of appellate hierarchy than do district courts hearing 
bankruptcy appeals.73 
 
see Salomon N. Am., 328 B.R. at 181 n.2 (noting the Ninth Circuit BAP’s prior holding that its 
decisions bind bankruptcy courts within the circuit, but also recognizing that some bankruptcy 
courts have rejected that holding); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 
1225 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing “binding nature of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decisions” as 
“an open question,” and “join[ing] Judge O’Scannlain’s call for the [Ninth Circuit] Judicial 
Council to consider an order clarifying whether the bankruptcy courts must follow the BAP”); 
Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1989) (“BAP decisions cannot 
bind the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts must always be free 
to decline to follow BAP decisions and to formulate their own rules within their jurisdiction.”); id. 
at 472 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (writing “separately to propose that the Judicial Council of 
this Circuit consider adoption of an order requiring that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel . . . 
decisions shall bind all of the bankruptcy courts of the circuit, subject to the restrictions imposed 
by article III so well discussed in the [court’s] opinion”); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, 
Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 525, 531 (1995) (“Even stronger arguments can be made against any stare decisis effect at all 
for the opinion of a bankruptcy appellate panel.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129–30 (“I 
would argue that district courts should be bound by BAP decisions. The view that an Article I 
court can never bind an Article III court is an overstatement.”); Trujillo, supra note 60, at 494 
n.23 (arguing that BAPs function as district courts, and accordingly cannot issue binding 
opinions). 
 71. See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 70, at 529 (noting that “[n]one of the district judges is 
bound by a bankruptcy appeals decision of a district judge from one of the other 93 district 
courts,” and that “district judges in multi-judge districts are not even bound by the bankruptcy 
appeals decisions of other judges from that same district”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at 
1095–96; id. at 1096 n.116 (“I am aware of only a handful of cases where district judges in the 
same district adopt differing views of the same question of bankruptcy law and in those cases one 
or both of the decisions is unpublished.”). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Romano, 350 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005) (“[A] single decision of 
a district court in this multi-judge district is not binding upon this court.”); id. at 277–81 
(summarizing authority for both sides); Paul Steven Singerman & Paul A. Avron, Of Precedents 
and Bankruptcy Court Independence, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56–57 (2003) (noting conflict, 
gathering authorities, and finding that a majority of bankruptcy courts have held that they are 
not bound by the decision of a single district court judge in a multi-judge district); Trujillo, supra 
note 60, at 494 (arguing that a bankruptcy decision by one bankruptcy judge cannot bind other 
bankruptcy judges in the same district, and that a bankruptcy decision by one district judge 
cannot bind other district judges or bankruptcy judges in the same district). But see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129 (“While a district court exercising original jurisdiction cannot 
bind other district courts, its decisions should be binding on bankruptcy courts when the district 
court is serving as an appeals court.”). 
 73. Our point here is simply that BAPs seem to fit more cleanly into the standard 
hierarchical appellate model than do district courts sitting on appeal, not that that is necessarily 
mandated under the current statutory scheme or normatively desirable. The latter two points 
are debatable. 
 With respect to the current statutory scheme, there are statements in the legislative history 
indicating that Congress created the BAPs to help foster greater uniformity in bankruptcy law. 
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See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“It should be 
recognized that the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a 
dependable body of bankruptcy case law.”). But see Daly, 255 B.R. at 273: 
Any suggestion that Congress’ authorization of the creation of BAP Services 
was motivated substantially by its desire to create a uniform body of 
bankruptcy law within the circuits is not supported by the BAP Service’s 
history, which instead suggests that BAPs were conceived primarily as a tool 
for relieving district court judges of an ofttimes undesirable and burdensome 
aspect of their workload.  
At the same time, one can point to the certification procedure in section 158(d)(2) of the Judicial 
Code—under which courts of appeals may decide interlocutory appeals when, among other 
circumstances, the question raised is one “as to which there is no controlling decision of the court 
of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005)—as evidence that Congress chose other, explicit means of 
increasing bankruptcy law uniformity. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 148 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 206. 
 Commentators are divided over whether BAP decisions bind bankruptcy courts. Compare, 
e.g., Bussel, supra note 13, at 1098 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should consider both BAP 
and district court decisions as binding precedent), Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“From [a] 
functional perspective, I think that BAP decisions clearly should be binding on bankruptcy 
courts.”), and Camp, supra note 52, at 1676–84 (arguing that BAPs should bind both bankruptcy 
and district courts within a circuit), with Trujillo, supra note 60, at 492 (“[O]nly opinions of the 
U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts by reason of formal 
hierarchy.”), and Caminker, supra note 13, at 870–72 (arguing that theoretical considerations 
argue in favor of bankruptcy courts being bound by district court decisions). Moreover, strict 
application of vertical stare decisis is difficult, insofar as it is not certain until after the 
bankruptcy court has issued judgment into which appellate path the case will proceed. Cf. Camp, 
supra note 52, at 1682: 
Since bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision 
whether it will be a BAP or a district court that will hear any appeal, and 
since no district court has so far considered itself bound by a BAP, it is no 
surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP decisions.  
Compare this to the United States Tax Court, which considers itself bound by its own precedent, 
except insofar as it has also held that it is bound “to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is 
squarely in point where appeal from [the] decision lies to that Court of Appeals.” Golsen v. 
Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Because the court of 
appeals to which a taxpayer will appeal is determined by his state of residence, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7482(b)(1) (2000), it is always clear at the time of decision which circuit’s precedent is binding. 
 As to the normative question, there are those who argue that an increase in application of 
stare decisis would be normatively desirable. See, e.g., Boroff, supra note 52, at 215, 221 (arguing 
that the current dual track appellate system makes it difficult to generate binding precedent, 
and that the system be changed to allow for development of binding precedent); Bussel, supra 
note 13, at 1095 n.114 (“[L]ogically . . . district courts . . . as well as bankruptcy courts might be 
bound by prior BAP decisions.”). There also are strong arguments, however, that a structure 
other than the standard appellate hierarchy might be desirable. First, one of the bases on which 
the pyramidal appellate hierarchy functions is the notion that issues “percolate” up from the 
lower courts to the higher courts. It is the desire for percolation that, commentators argue, 
restricts (and properly so) application of horizontal stare decisis to the same court and not to 
sibling courts of equal hierarchical stature. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The 
Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 834 (1990) (“The 
rejection of intercircuit stare decisis is premised upon—and given the obvious costs in deferring 
uniformity, is explainable only in terms of—the benefits of dialogue among the circuits.”); see 
also Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. 
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L. REV. 1309, 1351–52 (1995) (arguing, based upon social choice theory, that the Supreme Court 
“would desire intra- but not inter-circuit stare decisis,” since such a regime “avoids the 
irrationality that would result from cyclical preferences within particular circuits, while, at the 
same time, reducing the likelihood that legal doctrine that results from path manipulation in a 
given circuit will be replicated across the circuits.”). But cf. O’Hara, supra note 17, at 772 
(arguing that the absence of stare decisis across circuits is justified on the ground that “an 
agreement to follow another circuit’s precedents will not save the judges in a particular circuit 
much time”). In the case of appeals of core bankruptcy matters, there are, anomalously, two 
levels of intermediate appeals. Perhaps, then, in order for issues properly to percolate up to the 
courts of appeals, there ought to be no horizontal stare decisis at the first intermediate level—
that is, at the level of the BAPs and district courts. 
 Second, given that the BAPs and district courts lie at the same hierarchical level, it might 
not make sense for horizontal stare decisis rules to apply to BAPs but not district courts. 
Perhaps, once again, horizontal stare decisis should not apply at all. One might argue, to the 
contrary, that horizontal stare decisis should apply to both courts. See Chemerinsky, supra note 
4, at 129. 
 Third, perhaps bankruptcy law and society would be better served by a system other than 
the traditional appellate hierarchy, at the lower levels of appeals of core bankruptcy matters. 
Civil law systems rely far less on precedent than does the common law system dominant in the 
United States. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Civil law judiciaries decide cases based 
largely upon the proper interpretation of the governing “code.” Insofar as bankruptcy turns upon 
the content of a code—the “Bankruptcy Code”—bankruptcy seems to provide an ideal setting for 
application of such judicial review. Cf. Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the 
Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law 
and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 216 (2000) (arguing for “a softer, more nimble, 
rule of precedent [that] would improve the quality of outcomes in particular bankruptcy cases”). 
Interestingly, while Ponoroff facially argues in favor of increased reliance on a civil law 
jurisprudential approach in the bankruptcy context, his arguments do not seem to accord so well 
with the principles underlying the structure of judicial review in civil law systems. Dean 
Ponoroff laments: 
The opportunity for two levels of appeal as a matter of right has contributed 
to the crush of reported decisions, a phenomenon that, in my view, has 
hampered pragmatic and considered decisionmaking in the bankruptcy 
courts. That problem is compounded by the disturbing rise in adherence to 
textual or plain meaning methods of interpretation in bankruptcy cases, 
particularly in the decisions of the circuit courts of appeal[s]. 
Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted). Ponoroff thus seems more concerned with allowing different 
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code to percolate up through the judiciary. He also seems to 
embrace more of a realist conception of bankruptcy law than a civil law conception, explaining 
that “[a] more forward-looking, and less technical and ‘busy,’ code would abate the pressure to 
decide and review cases on the kind of formal, textualist grounds that typically prove the most 
difficult to distinguish in subsequent cases.” Id. at 216. Indeed, Ponoroff acknowledges that he 
endorses “a different style of judging, one that eschews a strict adherence to precedent, but not 
by any means civilian, to the extent that style is perceived as the unimaginative and rote 
application of positive legal rules to particular fact situations performed by a cadre of mid-level 
bureaucrats.” Id. at 223. “Rather,” he endorses “a style that actually places greater responsibility 
on the decisionmaker to reason analogically from code principles, as well as from subsidiary 
sources such as custom, usages, settled jurisprudential doctrine, and equity.” Id. at 223–24. 
 To the possible objection that the fact that the higher levels of bankruptcy judicial review—
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court—rely upon the standard appellate hierarchy, one can 
point to the coexistence of Louisiana’s civil law system within the United States judicial system 
as an example of how such a system can function. See, e.g., Shelp v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 333 F.2d 
431, 439 (5th Cir. 1964) (in determining Louisiana law under Erie, federal courts should apply 
precedential rules that Louisiana’s highest court would apply); Alvin Rubin, Hazards of a 
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It is only the final criterion—the question of judicial 
independence—on which district courts have some advantage over 
bankruptcy appellate panels. Judicial independence has been 
considered to be a function of life tenure and the guarantee of 
nonreduction in salary. Both attributes are enshrined in the Article III 
status conferred on district judges, whereas bankruptcy judges who sit 
on bankruptcy appellate panels do not get the benefit of either 
attribute because of their non-Article III status.74 
On this basis, one might readily conclude that district judges 
enjoy judicial independence while bankruptcy judges do not. But this 
would be a facile conclusion that improperly casts the assessment of 
judicial independence as an all-or-nothing proposition—that is, 
judicial independence is attainable only through life tenure and the 
guarantee of nonreducible remuneration. Careful consideration of the 
matter, however, suggests that the difference may be narrower than 
that generally perceived by courts and commentators. 
A more felicitous account reveals that the term of appointment 
for bankruptcy judges, the standard for their removal from office, the 
treatment of their compensation, and the manner of their 
appointment afford bankruptcy judges a moderate amount of judicial 
independence. First, although bankruptcy judges are not granted life 
 
Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369 
(1988). But see John Burritt McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference Erie 
Rule for Louisiana State Court Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313 (2006). Indeed, the notion that 
bankruptcy courts do not consider themselves bound by rulings of single district judges in multi-
judge districts—and therefore presumably do at some point consider themselves bound once a 
number of district judges in the same district reach the same conclusion—resembles the 
“jurisprudence constante” under which precedent develops in Louisiana and other civil law 
systems. See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or 
Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (describing jurisprudence 
constante as a doctrine under which “a case may be used to discern a pattern [of decisions] that 
may aid in interpretation”); Stearns, supra, at 1357 n.143 (discussing jurisprudence constante); 
cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 257 (1985) (proposing, “as a 
special rule of stare decisis, the practice that when the first three circuits to decide an issue have 
decided it the same way, the remaining circuits defer to that decision”). Any potential difficulties 
in integrating a civil law precedential model into the larger common law-based federal court 
system would be mitigated by the fact that the vast majority of bankruptcy cases are not 
appealed beyond the first level of intermediate appellate review. See Bussel, supra note 13, at 
1091; cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that “[b]ankruptcy law matters seem to fit in 
between . . . two poles” in that “bankruptcy statutes are filled with ambiguities that require court 
interpretation,” while there also “probably exist particular types of disputes where the law-giving 
function of the court is less important and alternative dispute resolution would be potentially 
more efficient”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at 1097 (“I would have difficulty understanding 
why Congress would intend BAPs and district courts to serve merely as rest-stops on the road to 
real appellate review.”). 
 74. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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tenure, their terms last fourteen years.75 Moreover, their 
appointments may be renewed,76 and indeed in most cases are 
renewed.77 While judicial independence may be fostered by life tenure, 
the renewable, fourteen-year term of bankruptcy judges effectively 
allows them to serve as long as many of their Article III 
counterparts.78 Even if the absence of life tenure gives Congress 
leeway to reduce the term of bankruptcy judges79—an option that it 
has never exercised since it created the bankruptcy courts—the 
fourteen-year, renewable term still grants a fair amount of judicial 
independence to bankruptcy judges.80 
Second, the Judicial Code prescribes that a bankruptcy judge 
may be removed “only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, 
or physical or mental disability,”81 whereas the Constitution mandates 
that an Article III judge will hold his or her office only “during good 
Behaviour.”82 The broad language of the good-behavior standard for 
 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 76. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat. 
3847, 3852 (providing that, “[w]hen filling vacancies, the court of appeals may consider 
reappointing incumbent bankruptcy judges under procedures prescribed by regulations issued by 
the Judicial Conference of the United States”). 
 77. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (noting that, of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the 
bench in the decade prior to 2005, only 10 did so as a result of not being reappointed); see also 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations § 1(e) 
(2001), available at http://207.41.19.15/Web/OCELibra.nsf (follow “Bankruptcy” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2008)  
(providing that “[t]he court of appeals shall decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent 
[bankruptcy] judge before considering other potentially qualified candidates” (emphasis added)). 
To the contrary, one might argue that the fact that bankruptcy judges must seek, and generally 
receive, reappointment, demonstrates the absence of judicial independence. 
 78. See In re Grabill Corp., 976 F.2d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) 
(“Rhetoric about life tenure notwithstanding, there is no substantial difference between the 14-
year term to which bankruptcy judges are appointed and service ‘during good Behavior’ for 
Article III judges.”). Article III judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) whose service on the 
federal bench terminated between 1983 and 2003 served, on average, twenty-four years. Judith 
Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 618 chart 4 (2005). 
 79. While Congress may reduce the duration of the fixed-term appointment for bankruptcy 
judges at any point via statute, the constitutionally guaranteed life tenure granted to Article III 
judges could only be stripped away via constitutional amendment (an exponentially more 
difficult proposition). 
 80. See COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 95 (1973) (proposing 
various reforms “to enhance the real and apparent judicial independence of bankruptcy judges,” 
including “[e]xtension of the term of the bankruptcy judges from the present six years to the 
proposed fifteen years”); cf. Nash, supra note 20, at 2196 (observing that “one can question the 
degree to which life tenure in fact secures for judges a larger measure of judicial independence”). 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2000). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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removal arguably encompasses the grounds set forth by the Judicial 
Code for removal of bankruptcy judges. Moreover, while Article III 
judges may be removed only by impeachment,83 and bankruptcy 
judges may be removed by a majority of all of the judges of the judicial 
council of the bankruptcy judge’s circuit,84 the practical reality is that 
very few bankruptcy judges have been removed from office.85 If the 
specter of removal does not appear to be greater for bankruptcy judges 
than Article III judges, it follows that bankruptcy judges need not 
limit their behavior in ways that would prevent them from acting as 
independently as Article III judges. 
Third, although the Supreme Court has identified the “fixed 
and irreducible” compensation provided to Article III judges by the 
Compensation Clause as a hallmark of an independent judiciary,86 the 
lack of a similar guarantee in the salaries of bankruptcy judges should 
not be overemphasized in assessing their judicial independence. Since 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and created the 
current scheme for federal bankruptcy judgeships, the salary of 
bankruptcy judges has only increased.87 Moreover, since 1987, 
bankruptcy judges have received a salary at an annual rate that 
equals 92% of the salary of district court judges (as determined by 
section 135 of the Judicial Code).88 Thus, for the past two decades, 
bankruptcy judges have had fixed compensation that nearly equals 
that of district court judges. 
Finally, if one takes into account the substantive differences in 
the appointment processes of bankruptcy judges and district judges 
and the consequences that flow therefrom, it becomes clear that 
bankruptcy judges may be better situated than district judges to resist 
the political influence that would threaten to compromise an 
independent judiciary. While the judicial appointment process for 
 
 83. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion) (“The ‘good Behaviour’ Clause guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life 
tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment.”). But see Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. 
Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE. L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that federal judges 
may be removed from office by means other than impeachment). 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e). 
 85. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (listing reasons for departure from the bench for the 
115 bankruptcy judges who did so in the decade prior to 2005, but not mentioning removal as one 
of those reasons). On the other hand, one might argue that the low rate of removal of bankruptcy 
judges reflects the absence of judicial independence: bankruptcy judges have behaved in a way so 
as to avoid removal. 
 86. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 at 59 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 87. See Mabey, supra note 62, app. A. 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a). Congress amended the Judicial Code in 1987 to provide for the 
current salary structure for bankruptcy judges. Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 408(a), 101 Stat. 1329, 
1329-26 (1987). 
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Article III judges has become increasingly politicized, evidenced most 
recently by the tendency for close examination of the ideology of 
nominees,89 the appointment process for bankruptcy judges has 
seemingly remained nonpolitical. The Judicial Code charges the 
appointment task to the court of appeals for the circuit in which there 
exists a vacancy for a bankruptcy judgeship.90 Thus, the appointment 
process involves judges selecting judges—a presumably nonpolitical 
process.91 This nonpolitical process has produced a bankruptcy bench 
 
 89. See Nash, supra note 20, at 2182–92. 
 90. 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005); id. § 152(a)(3) (2000). 
 91. The possibility exists, however, that the judicial appointment of judges may substitute 
judicial patronage for political patronage and thus compromise judicial independence. See Judith 
Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the 
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 673 (2002). But 
see Posner, supra note 23, at 81–82 (“Appointments by the judicial branch are not as 
controversial, because judges belong to different parties.”). Furthermore, one may argue that, 
insofar as the circuit judges are a product of a politicized appointment process, they themselves 
may be politicized and thus infuse politics into the appointment process for bankruptcy judges. 
The merit-selection process for appointing bankruptcy judges, however, seems to have provided 
little opportunity for such politicization to take root. A quick look at the manner in which the 
Ninth Circuit conducts this process (one that seems representative of the process conducted in 
other circuits) suggests why this has been the case. 
 Interested candidates must submit applications for the position. See Judicial Council of the 
Ninth Circuit, Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges § 2.02 (2001), 
available at http://207.41.19.15/Web/OCELibra.nsf (follow “Bankruptcy” hyperlink; then follow 
“Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2008). The Circuit advertises nationally and encourages the federal judicial districts 
within the circuit to advertise intensely and locally. Id. § 2.01. A local merit screening committee, 
which generally consists of (1) the chief judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to 
be appointed, (2) the president of the state bar association, (3) the president of one or more local 
bar associations within the district, (4) the dean of a law school located within the district, (5) the 
administrative circuit judge of the circuit geographical unit in which the bankruptcy judge is to 
be appointed, and (6) the chief bankruptcy judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is 
to be appointed. Id. § 3.02(a). The committee recommends five applicants to the Court-Council 
Committee on Bankruptcy Appointments, whose membership includes three circuit judges who 
serve as voting members. See id. §§ 3.03(c)(1), 3.04(b). The Court-Council Committee circulates a 
report to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council recommending a candidate for appointment, and 
that report will be deemed to be the Judicial Council’s recommendation to the Court of Appeals 
(unless the Council determines that the Court-Council Committee should reconsider its 
recommendation). Id. §§ 3.04(c)(5), 3.05(a). The recommended candidate is appointed upon a 
majority vote of the members of the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(3) (2000). 
 For the argument that the nonpolitical nature of the bankruptcy bench may be attributable 
to the opacity of the process for selecting bankruptcy judges, see Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of 
Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1205002. 
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populated mostly by specialists with bankruptcy expertise92 who 
themselves could be characterized as nonpolitical.93 
When one considers the type of jurist produced by the judicial 
selection process for bankruptcy judges in conjunction with their term 
of appointment, the standard for their removal, and the treatment 
afforded to their compensation, it would appear that bankruptcy 
judges have achieved a considerable degree of judicial independence.94 
Accordingly, while the district court seems to enjoy some advantage 
over BAPs with respect to this final attribute identified as improving 
the quality of appellate review, the advantage is not likely to be 
substantial. We summarize the differences in the attributes of the 
BAPs and district courts below in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
STRUCTURE OF DISTRICT COURTS AND BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS 
 
First-Tier 
Appellate 
Court 
Number 
of 
Judges 
Bankruptcy 
Expertise 
Other 
Lawfinding 
Ability 
Traditional 
Appellate 
Hierarchy 
Judicial 
Independence 
District 
Court 
Single 
judge 
Unlikely Some Weak Strong 
Bankruptcy 
Appellate 
Panel 
Panel of 
three 
judges 
Yes Some Strong Moderate 
 
B. Hypotheses 
Insofar as BAPs exhibit more of the features associated with 
quality appellate review than do federal district courts, the discussion 
in Part I suggests that BAPs will provide a higher quality of 
 
 92. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy 
practitioners in their prior careers.”). 
 93. Cf. Resnik, supra note 91, at 670 (“Turn first to the advantages of judicial appointment 
of judges. As a few details of current practices illustrate, the judiciary has selected a high-quality 
and relatively nonpolitical corps of judges . . . .”). 
 94. This state of affairs can be traced to congressional efforts in the 1970s to elevate the 
status of bankruptcy judges. Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States to evaluate the then-existing bankruptcy system and to suggest 
recommendations for its reform. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). In its report, the 
Commission envisioned that improvements in the appointment, tenure, and compensation of 
bankruptcy judges would enhance their “real and apparent judicial independence.” COMM’N ON 
THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, at 95 (1973). 
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bankruptcy appellate review than their district court counterparts—
assuming, of course, that the question of judicial independence does 
not outweigh other factors. Many challenges stand in the way of 
investigating this general claim, chief among them the difficulty in 
empirically testing the “correctness” of the dispositions rendered by 
the appellate court. Knowledge of this would be crucial for purposes of 
ascertaining whether the appellate court had appropriately performed 
its appellate function—that is, identifying error in those instances 
when it occurred. Making such a determination would necessarily 
involve content analysis of appellate opinions according to a particular 
metric of correctness. It is difficult to develop such a metric without 
infusing a degree of inherent subjectivity into its design. What we may 
deem to be a “correct” decision may be “incorrect” according to others. 
Accordingly, at the initial stage of empirical inquiry, we are not 
persuaded that detailed content analysis of appellate opinions is 
warranted.95 
Absent detailed content analysis of appellate opinions, how 
might we empirically proceed with our inquiry into the quality of 
appellate review? Although we cannot empirically test the 
“correctness” of decisions, we can empirically test the perception held 
by other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system of the 
correctness of those decisions. For those bankruptcy appeals that 
proceed to the second tier of review, we can consider whether the court 
of appeals deemed proper the disposition rendered by the first-tier 
appellate court. 
There are several ways in which the rate at which a higher 
court upholds a lower court’s disposition may shed light upon judicial 
perceptions of correctness of lower court decisions.96 First, there is a 
tautological sense in which what an appellate court says is, by 
 
 95. Professor Frank Cross has expressed a similar view in his empirical study of decisions 
rendered by U.S. Courts of Appeals: 
[T]here are typically nonfrivolous legal arguments for each side in circuit 
court cases, so it is impossible to code certain cases as being legally correct (or 
incorrect) without the researcher second-guessing and effectively overriding 
the judge. Such an approach offers an unreliable tool for evaluating judicial 
decisions because it probably reflects more about the researcher than about 
the judges being evaluated. Research requires a more objective tool for 
evaluating the law. 
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 46–47 (2007). 
 96. But see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 1127–28 (noting the limits of “result-
oriented statistical studies”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A 
New Window into the Behavior of Judges? 5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 06-29, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913663 (using empirical data to argue 
that judges of one political party are more likely to cite opinions authored by judges of the same 
party, especially in particular “high stakes” settings). 
NASHPARDO_PAGE 11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM 
2008] INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE 1771 
definition, correct (unless, that is, the appellate court decision is itself 
reversed). Thus, if an appellate court affirms the disposition of a lower 
court, then the lower court’s disposition was correct. Second, one can 
presume that the appellate court wishes to resolve the legal issues 
“correctly” for the parties and for future courts.97 The law generally 
calls upon appellate courts to examine legal issues de novo without 
deference to the reasoning or conclusion of the court below.98 Still, if 
the appellate court ultimately reaches the same conclusion as the 
court below, then it is accurate to say that the appellate court 
perceived the lower court’s conclusion to be correct.99 
However, courts of appeals may not always affirm a decision 
because they believe the earlier decision was “correct.” Judges need 
not be so selfless. Indeed, there is a school of thought that views 
judges, like all people, as self-interested actors.100 Judges may be 
interested in keeping their jobs—for bankruptcy judges, this 
translates to reappointment. Insofar as district judges enjoy Article III 
status, they have life tenure and are guaranteed not to suffer any 
salary reductions. Still, even Article III judges may have dreams of 
 
 97. See supra note 17. 
 98. See, e.g., Concannon v. Imperial Capital Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 93 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy Code de novo.”); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Valley-Vulcan Mold 
Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co.), 237 B.R. 322, 326 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
1999) (stating that conclusions of law by bankruptcy court are reviewed by BAP de novo); 9 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 470 
(2006).  
 99. It is possible that, notwithstanding the legal standard to the contrary, appellate courts 
do not always reexamine legal issues de novo in practice. Perhaps, for example, courts of appeals 
are inclined to rely upon the expertise of BAPs (sub rosa, of course, since the law dictates 
otherwise) and thus are inclined to affirm BAP opinions. Or, perhaps equally, the appellate 
courts might more often than not affirm district court opinions on the ground that district judges 
enjoy Article III status and thus are independent. In either case, it would be accurate to view an 
appellate court affirmance as embracing the lower court opinion as correct. 
 100. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 737–38 (suggesting that judges make decisions “to impose 
their normative views, beliefs, and mores on [society]”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and 
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) 
(“Judges are rational, and they pursue instrumental and consumption goals of the same general 
kind and in the same general way that private persons do.”). 
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higher office.101 Article III judges—and, for that matter, BAP judges—
may also wish to avoid the “ignominy” of reversal by a higher court.102 
Even if BAP judges and district judges have an aversion to 
reversal, that ought not to change appellate judges’ behavior in terms 
of upholding the conclusion of lower court decisions, assuming at least 
that the reappointment or elevation process does not demand political 
decisionmaking.103 Put another way, a judge—whether a bankruptcy 
judge serving on a BAP or a district judge—who wants to be 
reappointed or elevated has essentially the same incentive to decide 
cases correctly as do judges who simply want to decide the disputes 
before them correctly. As such, a court reviewing a first-level 
intermediate bankruptcy appellate decision—whether a panel of a 
court of appeals or the Supreme Court—should adopt the conclusion of 
the lower court if it deems that conclusion to be “correct.” Similarly, 
appellate court judges should seek to affirm correct decisions—and 
reverse incorrect ones—even if their motives are not strictly to reach 
correct outcomes. 
Based upon the foregoing, we offer the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Courts of appeals more likely will uphold the 
dispositions rendered by BAPs than those rendered by district courts. 
 
Citation rates provide yet another basis on which to test 
empirically the perceived correctness of an appellate opinion.104 To the 
 
 101. See Nash, supra note 20, at 2196. Indeed, Professor Resnik has identified such 
careerism by bankruptcy judges. See Resnik, supra note 91, at 673 (observing that “[a]n 
increasingly well-trodden path is for a person to shift from magistrate or bankruptcy judge to 
district court judge”). A recent study of the bankruptcy bench, however, indicated that only eight 
of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench from 1995 to 2005 did so as a result of 
appointment to an Article III judgeship. Mabey, supra note 62, at 107. 
 102. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 827 & n.40 and the authorities cited therein; see 
also Nash, supra note 20, at 2197–98 (discussing the desire of Article III judges to avoid 
impeachment, public chastisement, and overruling by the legislature). 
 103. Note, however, that other motivations may explain bankruptcy judges’ behavior. See, 
e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy judges in different districts compete 
for large corporate bankruptcy cases); Marcus Cole, ‘Delaware Is Not a State’: Are We Witnessing 
Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1890–93 (2002) (arguing that, 
in order to conform to dominant state culture favorable to corporations, Delaware bankruptcy 
judges compete for corporate bankruptcy filings). 
 104. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that citation practices are not 
essentially a matter of taste but rather are systematic and susceptible to empirical study); John 
Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 
6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical 
Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. 
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extent that citation of one court by another reflects the citing court’s 
view that the other court was “correct” in some way, the notion of 
correctness is, in different ways, both narrower and broader than 
correctness in the context of affirmation on direct appeal. It is 
narrower in that the citing court well may be citing a case not based 
upon a broad holding, but rather based upon some narrow holding or 
even dicta. It is broader in that, unlike a court that affirms a lower 
court’s disposition even though it disagrees with its reasoning, a court 
that cites to another court’s decision positively at some level agrees 
with some aspect of the court’s reasoning.105 Of course, there may be 
situations where a court cites another court’s opinion simply because 
it perceives the other court’s opinion to be binding precedent.106 For 
this reason, we consider the results of extracircuit citations and 
citations by courts of appeals to BAPs and district courts—settings 
where there is no issue of binding precedent and citation is purely a 
matter of choice—to be especially informative.107 
Within this context, one can point to two broad notions as to 
why courts cite other courts’ opinions; both accord with our broad 
understanding of “correctness.” First, a court may cite to another 
court’s decision because it is truly influenced by the other court’s 
reasoning.108 If this is true, then the citing court in some sense finds 
the other court’s reasoning to be “correct.” Alternatively (or perhaps in 
addition), a court may cite to another court’s decision not so much to 
explain the basis for its decision as to justify that decision, thus 
 
CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations]; cf. William M. 
Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of 
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271–76 (1998) (noting that “[c]itations 
are at best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence,” and identifying potential 
drawbacks and limitations to empirical analyses of judicial citations). 
 105. See Landes & Posner, supra note 104, at 251 & n.3 (excluding from citation study 
“citations indicating rejection of the cited case as a precedent”). Our study also includes only 
positive citations. But see Landes et al., supra note 104, at 273 (deciding “not [to] distinguish . . . 
between favorable, critical, or distinguishing citations” insofar as “[c]ritical citations, in 
particular to opinions outside the citing circuit, are also a gauge of influence since it is easier to 
ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for not following it”). 
 106. See Landes & Posner, supra note 104, at 251 (excluding from citation study 
nonprecedential citations). 
 107. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State 
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 340–41 (1997) (stating that cases 
cited for their influential nature will depend more on the quality of the decisions than the 
stature of the cited court). 
 108. See id. at 339 (suggesting that citations may “indicate intercourt communication and 
influence on judicial decisionmaking”); cf. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 651 (“The 
availability of published opinions is generally thought to be an important aspect of the appellate 
process because written opinions provide guidance to judges and litigants by explaining the 
reasons for the appellate decision.”). 
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making the “primary function” of citations one of “legitimation.”109 
Even if a court simply cites to another court to legitimate its own 
conclusions, we would say that the citing court perceives of the other 
court’s reasoning as “correct” in some sense. Indeed, the citing court is 
using the citation to bolster the perception that its own reasoning and 
conclusions are “correct.” 
In light of the foregoing, and as detailed below, we proceed to 
test the perceived correctness of an appellate opinion by considering 
(1) the propensity of other federal courts within the bankruptcy 
judicial structure to cite the opinions issued by first-tier appellate 
courts, (2) the depth of treatment given to such opinions by federal 
citing courts (including direct quotation),110 and (3) the immediacy 
with which such opinions garner a citing reference. Accordingly, we 
offer the following additional hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2A: Federal courts more likely will positively cite to BAP 
opinions than to district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: Federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more 
frequently than to district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Courts of appeals will cite more frequently to BAP 
opinions than to district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Bankruptcy courts will cite more frequently to BAP 
opinions than to district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 5: BAPs will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to 
district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 6: District courts will cite more frequently to district court 
opinions than to BAP opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Federal courts outside of the circuit of the first-tier 
appellate court that issued the opinion (extracircuit federal courts) will 
cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Positive federal citing references will afford a greater 
depth of treatment to BAP opinions than to district court opinions. 
 
 
 109. Walsh, supra note 107, at 339. 
 110. Cf. id. at 342 (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” citations). 
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Hypothesis 9A: Positive federal citing references are more likely to 
quote directly BAP opinions than district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 9B: Positive federal citing references will directly quote 
BAP opinions more frequently than district court opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The time within which a federal citing reference will be 
made to opinions issued on appeal by BAPs will be faster than to those 
issued by district courts. 
 
Notably, in Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7, we hypothesize that 
BAP opinions will be cited more often than district court opinions. We 
suggest this on the ground that several factors weigh in favor of the 
conclusion that BAPs will resolve issues of bankruptcy law “correctly,” 
while only one factor—judicial independence—weighs in favor of 
district courts. 
It seems to us highly probable, a priori, that bankruptcy judges 
and BAP judges are unlikely to be concerned with the fact that the 
bankruptcy judges who serve on BAPs do not enjoy Article III 
status.111 Accordingly, we have developed Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Hypothesis 3 is to similar effect. It seems to us that courts of appeals 
would be more focused on the structural factors favoring BAPs than 
the lack of Article III status—particularly with respect to subject-
matter expertise.112 Note first that, to the extent that the absence of 
Article III status may suggest a lack of independence vis-à-vis the 
issues in the case or the parties, that problem is greatly ameliorated 
by the fact that the parties must have consented in order to have the 
BAP issue a decision in the first place. Second, court of appeals judges 
presumably do not need the buffer of Article III status to remind them 
that they sit several notches above bankruptcy judges and BAPs on 
the judicial food chain.113 
The same cannot be said for district judges. That district judges 
lobbied against giving bankruptcy judges Article III status 
demonstrates how important it is to district judges that bankruptcy 
 
 111. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 628 (“Bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) 
judges provide specialized bankruptcy expertise that their bankruptcy colleagues . . . value 
highly as a source of authority.”). 
 112. See id. at 678 (“Circuit judges, on average, have less specialized knowledge than 
bankruptcy judges, particularly those selected to serve on BAPs.”). 
 113. It is also conceivable that courts of appeals in circuits that have BAPs are somewhat 
favorably inclined to cite to those BAPs, to the extent that they consider the BAPs to be adjuncts 
of the courts of appeals. See supra note 51. 
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judges not enjoy this status.114 Further, district judges lie on the same 
level as BAPs on the bankruptcy appellate hierarchy.115 In short, it 
seems that district judges will think of BAPs as coequals in terms of 
hierarchy at best, and as subordinates at worst. Accordingly, we think 
it comparatively less likely that district judges, as opposed to other 
federal judges, would look to opinions authored by BAPs as opposed to 
district judges. It is on these bases that we preliminarily offer 
Hypothesis 6. 
Given our hypotheses that other courts within the bankruptcy 
judicial structure are more likely to cite to BAP opinions (with the 
exception of Hypothesis 6), we further hypothesize that the underlying 
motivations prompting such citation practices will also lead these 
courts to discuss BAP opinions in greater detail and to cite to BAP 
opinions with more immediacy. We thus propose Hypotheses 9 and 10. 
We now turn to evidence from the findings of our study and use 
that evidence to evaluate our hypotheses empirically. 
 
 III.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW: EVIDENCE FROM APPELLATE BANKRUPTCY OPINIONS 
This Part presents the results of our empirical study of 
appellate bankruptcy opinions issued both at the first-tier and second-
tier levels of appellate review in the bankruptcy judicial system. We 
test the hypotheses discussed above in Part II.B through the use of 
quantitative methodology and look for patterns that point to a 
relationship between the type of appellate court and the manner in 
which others perceive the quality of review provided by the court. In 
doing so, we seek to evaluate the theoretical assumptions that have 
evolved regarding those attributes considered to improve the quality 
of appellate review. We emphasize, however, that we do not purport to 
provide either a definitive or exhaustive account. We readily admit 
that we have chosen to study a narrow set of data from a snapshot in 
time that is not necessarily representative of the general universe of 
bankruptcy appeals. Aware of these limitations, we nonetheless have 
strong convictions that a great deal of valuable information can be 
gleaned from the data and that this information will help guide future 
discussions. Ultimately, our goal is to begin a shift away from 
generalization and abstraction and to generate a more concrete 
 
 114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra fig.1. 
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understanding of how differences in appellate structure affect the 
quality of appellate review. 
This Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A sets forth the selection 
criteria used to constitute the sample for our study, discusses the 
major variables that we studied and incorporated into our statistical 
models, and details the general characteristics of the sample. Part 
III.B presents descriptive statistics comparing perceptions of the 
quality of appellate review provided by BAPs with perceptions of the 
quality of appellate review provided by district courts. Part III.C 
presents the central findings from our regression models, and Part 
III.D interprets our results. 
If those attributes identified as improving the quality of 
appellate review truly do so, we would expect to see a positive 
relationship between BAP opinions and their perceived quality. 
Furthermore, we would expect this relationship to be stronger than 
the relationship, if any, between district court opinions and their 
perceived quality. In summary, we find that the rates at which courts 
of appeals affirm appeals from BAPs and district courts provide 
support for the claim that BAPs are perceived to provide a better 
quality of review than the district courts. Furthermore, data on 
subsequent citation by federal courts to the opinions rendered on 
appeal by BAPs and district courts lend considerable support to the 
claim. Given the possible impact of selection effects on the affirmance 
data as opposed to the citation data, we consider the strongly robust 
results we observe in the citation context to be more informative. 
A. Sample Selection and Variables of Interest 
1. Sample Selection 
To constitute the sample of appellate bankruptcy opinions for 
this study, we formulated a search query in Westlaw’s FBKR-CS 
database, which contains reported and unreported case law documents 
(i.e., decisions and orders) relating to bankruptcy that were issued by 
various courts—including the Supreme Court, circuit courts of 
appeals, BAPs, district courts, and bankruptcy courts.116 Because we 
sought to create two separate databases, one for first-tier appellate 
dispositions by BAPs and district courts (the “first-tier database”) and 
one for second-tier appellate dispositions by courts of appeals (the 
 
 116. Reported case law documents are those released for publication in West Federal 
Reporters. 
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“second-tier database”), we ran two separate search queries. The first 
query consisted of the single term “11 U.S.C.,” the standard citation to 
title 11 of the United States Code (commonly referred to as the 
“Bankruptcy Code”), coupled with (1) a date restriction that limited 
query retrieval to decisions and orders issued during the three-year 
period beginning on October 1, 1997 and ending on September 30, 
2000;117 and (2) a field restriction that limited query retrieval to 
decisions and orders whose preliminary field contained either the term 
“district court” or “bankruptcy appellate panel,” but not “court of 
appeals.”118 The second query mirrored the first query with the 
exception that the field restriction limited query retrieval to decisions 
and orders whose preliminary field only contained the term “court of 
appeals.”119 The first query produced 1,487 documents, while the 
second query produced 871 documents. These large numbers clearly 
presented a challenge by virtue of the time it would take to review 
each document. We sought to reduce the time demand by randomly 
selecting for review approximately one-quarter of the documents 
produced by each search query—specifically, 372 documents from the 
first search query and 218 documents from the second search query.120 
In order to identify those that would be selected for inclusion and 
analysis in the two databases, we reviewed these documents according 
to the procedures described below. 
We sought to include in the databases appeals that involved 
the resolution of dispositions rendered by bankruptcy courts in core 
proceedings.121 We included only those documents that disposed of the 
appeal on the merits. (Because most of these documents were opinions 
rather than orders, for ease of reference we will collectively refer to 
the documents as opinions for the remainder of the Article.) Opinions 
that solely involved procedural dispositions (e.g., dismissal for lack of 
 
 117. Coverage for the FBKR-CS database begins with the year 1789. 
 118. The preliminary field for case law documents (i.e., decisions or orders issued by a court) 
in Westlaw is found at the top of such documents and generally contains the name of the court 
that issued the document. In its entirety, the first search query was as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr 
(“district court” “bankruptcy appellate panel” % “court of appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef 
10/01/2000). 
 119. In its entirety, the second search query was as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“court of 
appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000). 
 120. Each search query produced a numbered result list in which the opinions were listed in 
reverse chronological order. For the first-tier database, the results were organized by court in 
reverse chronological order (i.e., district court opinions were listed first in reverse chronological 
order followed by BAP opinions listed in reverse chronological order). We used a random number 
generator to select the opinions from each result list that we would analyze. For each result list, 
we randomly generated a set of unique numbers falling within the range of the total documents 
retrieved by the search query. 
 121. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction) were excluded. In most instances, each opinion generated 
one observation. However, some opinions generated multiple 
observations. For example, some opinions resolved multiple appeals in 
separate and unrelated bankruptcy cases. In other instances, an 
opinion would resolve an appeal of separate orders that were entered 
by the bankruptcy court in distinct proceedings within the same case. 
Finally, by virtue of the identical date restriction included in both 
search queries, each opinion was issued during one of three 
government fiscal years: 1998, 1999, or 2000.122 
Pursuant to these selection procedures, our first-tier database 
consists of 268 observations drawn from 264 opinions,123 4 of which 
produced a second observation. Our second-tier database consists of 
170 observations drawn from 165 opinions,124 5 of which produced a 
second observation. Not surprisingly, for both databases, the majority 
of appeals wended their way through the district courts rather than 
the BAPs—although more so for appeals in the second-tier database 
(approximately 81%) than the first-tier database (approximately 60%). 
 
 122. We tailored our search in this manner for two reasons. First, we wanted to facilitate 
comparisons of our data with official government data regarding bankruptcy appeals. Generally, 
such data track the government’s fiscal year, which begins on October 1st and ends on 
September 30th, rather than the calendar year. 
 Second, we chose the specific time period for this study in order to capture the BAP 
experience at its apex in terms of participating circuits. BAPs did not become a fixture of the 
bankruptcy judicial system until 1996. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 amended 
the Judicial Code to permit, but not require, the establishment of BAPs on a circuit-by-circuit 
basis. Only the First and Ninth Circuits chose to do so, establishing their BAPs in 1979 and 
1980, respectively. In the wake of the Marathon decision, however, the First Circuit concluded 
that continued operation of a BAP would be inappropriate until Congress remedied the defects in 
the constitutionally infirm, bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. Massachusetts v. Dartmouth 
House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984).  
 The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 
981 (9th Cir. 1984), holding that circuit court supervision of the BAP satisfied Marathon’s 
requirement of Article III judicial review. Despite the measures taken by Congress in 1984 
through the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act to address the Marathon 
decision, the First Circuit Judicial Council chose not to reauthorize its BAP, thus leaving the 
Ninth Circuit as the only circuit with an operating BAP. This state of affairs changed with the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended the Judicial Code to require the judicial council 
of each circuit to create a BAP absent a finding by the council that (1) insufficient judicial 
resources in the circuit would preclude its establishment, or (2) that establishment of a BAP 
would produce undue delay or increased cost to parties in bankruptcy cases. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 
§ 104(c)(3), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)). Prompted into action by this 
amendment, in 1996 the First Circuit reauthorized and the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits established BAPs. The Second Circuit BAP, however, ceased operations on July 1, 2000. 
 123. Thus, our selection criteria reduced the random sample of documents relating to the 
first-tier database by approximately 18%. 
 124. Similar to the first-tier database, see supra note 123, our selection criteria reduced the 
random sample of documents relating to the second-tier database by approximately 17%. 
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The distributions of opinions by circuit in each database roughly 
approximate one another.125 
As stated before, we do not seek in our study to make claims 
about the unobserved population of bankruptcy appeals but rather 
confine our commentary to the observed sample of data we have 
amassed. That said, we recognize that the story we seek to tell may 
not be as compelling if selection bias accounts for the results that we 
present. Accordingly, we seek to alleviate concerns regarding two 
major types of potential selection bias stemming from litigant choices 
that could produce a distorted picture: (1) case-selection bias and (2) 
forum-selection bias. 
It has been theorized that cases adjudicated at the trial level 
represent a nonrandom group by virtue of litigant choices.126 For a 
host of reasons, litigants may choose only a select group of cases for 
which to pursue a final adjudication by a trial court. If tried cases 
substantively differ from settled cases, a study that focuses solely on 
tried cases will misrepresent the larger world of litigation because 
most cases settle.127 An appeal further exacerbates the selection bias 
because (1) not all adjudicated cases are appealed and (2) not all 
appealed cases are disposed of by court decision. The bankruptcy 
appellate structure doubly compounds the problem given the two 
levels of intermediate appellate review. 
If these assumptions are correct, should they be of overriding 
concern in a study such as ours? We think not for the following 
reasons. First, case-selection bias should not impact our citation data 
insofar as a court is generally constrained to written opinions when it 
chooses those opinions to which it cites. Second, cases settled either at 
the trial or at the appellate level are not a relevant population for 
purposes of our study. Our study asks whether the circuit court will 
perceive the BAP to have performed the appellate function better than 
the district court. Because circuit courts are not autonomous 
decisionmaking bodies and can only resolve those appeals brought 
before them by the litigants, the only cases that can and should be 
measured for this purpose are those cases actually appealed to and 
 
 125. See infra Appendix tbl.1. 
 126. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 127. According to a recent empirical study, approximately 2% of federal civil lawsuits in 2002 
ended in trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 463 tbl.1 (2004). The 
bankruptcy analogue of a federal civil lawsuit is an adversary proceeding. See supra note 45. In 
2002, approximately 5% of adversary proceedings terminated during or after trial. Elizabeth 
Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915, 930 (2005). 
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resolved by the circuit courts.128 Last, Professor Frank Cross’s 
comprehensive empirical study of decisionmaking by the courts of 
appeals has documented that litigant effects are not a major 
determinant of circuit court decisions, both generally and in particular 
types of cases (i.e., criminal decisions and labor decisions).129 
We also recognize that our data potentially include a forum-
selection bias because attorneys in circuits that have BAPs may be 
more likely to prefer appeals relating to certain subject matters to be 
heard by BAPs than by district courts, or vice versa.130 Thus, it is 
possible that there are some issues that BAPs never or only rarely 
hear. (Assuming that bankruptcy cases are at some level homogenous 
nationwide, that will not be the case for district courts, because there 
are circuits in which district courts hear substantially all appeals from 
bankruptcy court rulings.) More generally, it is possible that BAP and 
district court dockets vary substantially. While we cannot eliminate 
this possibility, we have looked for evidence of such a bias and have 
found no such evidence.131 Thus, while recognizing that such a bias 
 
 128. Even if the group of appeals resolved by the circuit courts are nonrandom such that our 
results would not hold if the circuit courts also decided those cases that were not appealed 
beyond the first level of intermediate review, such theorizing is an exercise in futility. Simply 
put, we cannot measure the outcomes of circuit court decisions that do not exist. In other words, 
because we look to measure quality of appellate review that the circuit court perceives, we ought 
not to fret about those cases that will never see light of day in the circuit court. 
 129. CROSS, supra note 95, at 123–47. 
 130. Because the Judicial Code mandates that, in circuits with BAPs, bankruptcy appeals 
will be heard by the BAP unless one of the parties to the appeal elects to have the district court 
hear the appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005), the dynamic of any potential 
selection bias at work in the BAP perhaps should be understood as the product of the subset of 
appeals where the forum preferences of the parties to the appeal have aligned. Although there 
could be instances where all parties prefer to have the appeal heard by the district court, there 
would also be instances where only one party had such a preference. Thus, a BAP docket is 
unique in that all of its appeals theoretically involve litigants with a consistent forum preference. 
We say “theoretically” since it is conceivable that a party with an inconsistent forum preference 
may have failed, in a timely fashion, to elect a district court to hear the appeal. 
 131. Because we do not differentiate between district courts from circuits with BAPs (BAP 
circuits) and those from circuits without BAPs (non-BAP circuits) in our analyses, there is 
concern that any potential selection bias at work in BAP circuits could be masked by those 
observations from non-BAP circuits. Approximately 31% of the observations in the first-tier 
database and 36% of the observations in the second-tier database consisted of district court 
opinions from non-BAP circuits. See infra Appendix tbl.1. We conducted bivariate statistical 
analyses to ascertain whether selection bias existed in the BAP circuits by focusing on those 
circumstances in which one would expect to see such bias have a disproportionate effect—
namely, (1) the subject matter of the appeal and (2) affirmance rates by the court of appeals. For 
neither of these circumstances did we find evidence of selection bias. 
 First, we examined whether a statistically significant relationship exists in BAP circuits 
between the subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal. To 
do so, we classified observations according to whether the subject of the appeal fell into one of the 
four most frequently occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts. For the 
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may lurk at more refined levels of case-type delineation, we are at 
least confident that the size of any forum-selection bias is confined, 
not pernicious, and thus probably has not had a meaningful effect 
upon our data and analysis.132 
 
 
first-tier database, for all observations, and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four 
most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge, procedure/jurisdiction, 
avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the second-tier database, for all observations and for 
those observations from BAP circuits, the four most frequently occurring subjects were matters 
relating to discharge, claims, avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the first-tier database, 
approximately 56% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits as well as all district 
courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring subjects. For the second-tier 
database, approximately 64% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits and 59% of 
the appeals heard by all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently 
occurring subjects. After applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we found no 
statistically significant relationship in BAP circuits between the subject matter of the appeal and 
the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal (a p-value of 0.288 for the first-tier database and 
a p-value of 0.876 for the second-tier database). 
 Second, for all observations in the first-tier database, we examine whether a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the subject matter of the appeal and whether there is a 
subsequent appeal to the circuit court. Again, we classify observations according to whether the 
subject of the appeal fell into one of the four most frequently occurring subject matter 
categories. For those observations involving subsequent appeal to the circuit court, 
approximately 62% involved a top subject matter category. For those observations without circuit 
court review, approximately 56% involved a top subject matter category. Applying a chi-square 
test with one degree of freedom, we found no statistically significant relationship (p = 0.475) 
between the subject matter of the appeal and subsequent appeal to the circuit court. 
 Finally, we found that courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits at a rate 
similar to that of their counterparts in non-BAP circuits. In the first-tier database, there were 77 
observations for which there was a subsequent appeal to the court of appeals. The subsequent 
history for 10 of those observations, however, already existed in the second-tier database (i.e., the 
circuit court opinion from the second-tier database reviewed an opinion from the first-tier 
database). When combining the 67 unique observations from the first-tier database involving a 
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals with the 170 observations in the second-tier database, 
courts of appeals partly or fully affirmed district courts in BAP circuits approximately 77% of the 
time and partly or fully affirmed district courts in non-BAP circuits approximately 71% of the 
time. Bivariate analysis confirms that no statistically significant difference exists between the 
rate at which courts of appeals partly or fully affirmed district courts from BAP circuits and 
district courts from non-BAP circuits (chi-squared = 0.9094, df = 1, p = 0.340). Furthermore, if 
one considers only those observations where the court of appeals fully affirmed district courts, 
the affirmance rates in BAP and non-BAP circuits are similar. The circuit court affirmance rate 
of district court dispositions in BAP circuits was approximately 67% in comparison to 65% in 
non-BAP circuits. Bivariate analysis confirms that this difference is not statistically significant 
(chi-squared = 0.1419, df = 1, p = 0.706). 
 132. With respect to citations, if there is a forum-selection bias, then the BAPs are not 
deciding some categories of cases—and, perhaps, certain issues—that the district courts are. 
This logically should translate into an increase in citations to district court opinions as compared 
to BAP opinions, since other courts facing such issues and wishing to include citations will have 
no opportunity to cite to any BAP opinions. Yet, as we discuss below, our data analyses generally 
show that BAP citations are favored. In short, if there is a selection bias, then our statistical 
analyses, if anything, understate the extent to which BAP citations are favored. 
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2. Variables of Interest 
Recall that we sought to test our broad inquiry into the 
perceived quality of appellate review by focusing on (1) how two 
distinct appellate courts in the bankruptcy judicial system—the BAPs 
and district courts—perform their error-finding function and (2) how 
other judicial actors perceive the quality of that performance. As our 
hypotheses indicate, we concerned ourselves with an array of 
dependent variables that fall within one of two categories: 
(1) affirmance by the court of appeals and (2) citations by other federal 
courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district courts. 
We will discuss each category and the variables associated with each 
in turn. 
First, we tracked the disposition rendered by the BAP or 
district court on appeal according to three ordered outcomes: 
(1) “negative” for those dispositions where the reviewing court 
reversed, remanded, or vacated the disposition rendered below; 
(2) “hybrid” for those dispositions where the reviewing court partly 
affirmed the disposition rendered below; and (3) “positive” for those 
dispositions where the reviewing court fully affirmed the disposition 
rendered below.133 We define circuit court affirmance in two ways: 
broadly and narrowly. Broadly defined, affirmance occurred when the 
circuit court either partly or fully affirmed the disposition rendered by 
the first-tier appellate court (i.e., those observations with hybrid or 
positive outcomes).134 Narrowly defined, affirmance occurred only 
when the circuit court fully affirmed the disposition rendered by the 
first-tier appellate court (i.e., those observations with positive 
outcomes).135 Second, in order to document citation data to the 
opinions in our databases, we relied upon KeyCite, West’s citation 
research service.136 We documented for each first-tier level opinion all 
 
 133. For the frequency of the dispositions rendered on appeal in first-tier and second-tier 
level opinions, see infra Appendix tbl.2. 
 134. As set forth below, we denominate this variable “Affirmance.” See infra text 
accompanying notes 150–151. 
 135. As set forth below, we denominate this variable “Full Affirmance.” See id. 
 136. KeyCite organizes citing references for a case by segregating negative citing references 
from positive citing references. KeyCite further organizes negative and positive citing references 
according to the depth of treatment given by the citing reference to the cited opinion. Four 
categories exist for the depth of treatment provided by the citing reference: (1) “examined,” 
indicating that the citing reference contains an extended discussion of the cited opinion, usually 
more than a printed page of text; (2) “discussed,” indicating that the citing reference contains a 
substantial discussion of the cited opinion, usually more than a paragraph but less than a 
printed page; (3) “cited,” indicating that the citing reference contains some discussion of the cited 
opinion, usually less than a paragraph; and (4) “mentioned,” indicating that the citing reference 
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positive citations made to it by any federal court—aside from those 
citations made in connection with the direct appellate history of the 
opinion—during the five-year period following the date that the 
opinion was issued. Pursuant to these criteria, approximately 75% of 
the first-tier appellate opinions had citing references. We further 
documented (1) citations by type of court, (2) citations by depth of 
treatment, (3) citations directly quoting the cited opinion, and (4) the 
immediacy with which first-tier appellate opinions were cited.137 
The major explanatory variables (i.e., independent variables) in 
the databases include (1) whether the BAP or district court heard the 
initial appeal, (2) whether the appellant was solely the debtor in 
whose case the appeal arose, (3) whether the appellee was solely the 
debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (4) whether the appeal arose in 
the context of a case filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
(5) whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was filed 
by an individual, (6) whether the type of dispute proceeding within 
which the appeal arose was an adversary proceeding or contested 
matter, and (7) the subject matter of the appeal. 
B. Bivariate Descriptive Statistics 
Our primary interest lies in the statistical relationship 
between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and various 
dependent variables: (1) affirmance by the court of appeals, (2) the 
number of positive federal court citations to the opinion issued by the 
first-tier appellate court, (3) the depth of treatment given to first-tier 
appellate opinions when positively cited by other federal courts, (4) 
direct quotation of the first-tier appellate opinion by positive citing 
references, and (5) the immediacy with which the first-tier appellate 
opinion is positively cited. By searching for a statistically significant 
relationship between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and 
each of these dependent variables, we can look for those relationships 
warranting further inquiry through regression analysis that will 
confirm the existence of the relationship when controlling for other 
factors. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that courts of appeals more likely will 
uphold the dispositions rendered on appeal by BAPs than those 
rendered by district courts. Our data support this hypothesis. In the 
 
contains a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation. Finally, KeyCite 
identifies citing references that directly quote the cited opinion. 
 137. For citation data for those first-tier appellate opinions with positive citing references, 
see infra Appendix tbl.3. 
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first-tier database, there were 77 observations for which there was a 
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals.138 The subsequent history 
for 10 of those observations, however, already existed in the second-
tier database (i.e., the circuit court opinion from the second-tier 
database reviewed an opinion from the first-tier database). Combining 
the 67 unique observations in the first-tier database involving a 
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals with the 170 observations in 
the second-tier database, we generated a database of 237 observations 
for purposes of analyzing circuit court affirmance rates of first-tier 
appellate dispositions (the “affirmance database”). When defining 
affirmance broadly to include those dispositions where the circuit 
court either partly or fully affirmed the first-tier appellate court, the 
court of appeals affirmed BAPs approximately 91% of the time as 
opposed to 74% for district courts.139 If no association had existed 
between the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially decided 
the appeal and the disposition rendered on subsequent appeal by the 
court of appeals, we would have expected to see first-tier appellate 
dispositions partly or fully affirmed by the court of appeals 
approximately 78% of the time. Our analysis confirms that there is 
less than a 0.01 probability that random chance alone would have 
yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed. Similarly, when 
defining affirmance narrowly to include only those dispositions where 
the circuit court fully affirmed the first-tier appellate court, the court 
of appeals affirmed BAPs approximately 81% of the time as opposed to 
66% for district courts.140 If no association had existed between the 
 
 138. Of the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent 
appeal to the court of appeals, 50 were district court dispositions and 27 were BAP dispositions. 
As there were a total of 162 district court and 106 BAP dispositions in the first-tier database, 
infra Appendix tbl.1, approximately 31% of the district court dispositions and 25% of the BAP 
dispositions involved subsequent appeal. As our first-tier database only includes opinions that 
disposed of the appeal on the merits, these figures seem to be consistent with empirical evidence 
that has estimated that up to a third of first-tier appellate dispositions rendered on the merits 
have been further appealed to the court of appeals. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 
630; see also U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, STATISTICAL 
REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2005 – DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/ 
newbap/stats/q4-05.pdf (documenting that approximately 30% of bankruptcy appeals in the 
Eighth Circuit in 2005 were taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals). 
 139. The 91% circuit court affirmance rate of BAP dispositions approximates the rate at 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partly or fully affirmed merit-based BAP 
dispositions—that is, 90%—during the eleven-year period beginning on July 1, 1996 and ending 
on June 30, 2007. See U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS IN PARTICIPATING BAP DISTRICTS FOR THE STATISTICAL YEAR 
JULY 1, 2006 – JUNE 30, 2007 (INCLUDING DISPOSITION STATISTICS FOR APPEALS DISPOSED OF 
SINCE JULY 1, 1996) 8 (2007), available at http://www.bap10.uscourts.gov/stats/2007.pdf. 
 140. The 81% full affirmance rate of BAP dispositions by circuit courts approximates the rate 
at which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fully affirmed merit-based BAP 
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type of first-tier appellate court and circuit court affirmance, we would 
have expected to see first-tier appellate dispositions fully affirmed by 
the court of appeals approximately 70% of the time. Our analysis 
confirms that there is less than a 0.05 probability that random chance 
alone would have yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed.141 
Hypotheses 2 through 7 generally predict that, with the 
exception of district courts, other federal courts will positively cite to 
BAP opinions more than they positively cite to district court opinions. 
For district courts, we hypothesize that they will cite more often to 
district court opinions than BAP opinions. Finally, we predict that 
extracircuit citations to BAP opinions will exceed extracircuit citations 
to district court opinions. As an initial matter, BAP opinions had a 
higher propensity to be positively cited by other federal courts than 
district court opinions. Approximately 91% of the BAP opinions in the 
first-tier database had been positively cited by federal courts, whereas 
slightly less than two-thirds (65%) of the district court opinions had 
received similar treatment. In the absence of a relationship between 
the type of first-tier appellate opinion and positive citation thereto by 
other federal courts, we would have expected to see approximately 
three-quarters (75%) of the first-tier appellate opinions positively 
cited. Our analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.0001 
probability that random chance alone would have yielded a difference 
as large as the one witnessed. It would thus appear that the type of 
first-tier appellate opinion has some influence on a federal court’s 
decision to cite that opinion. 
We can further elaborate on this relationship by examining the 
number of citing references to the opinions according to the type of 
federal court making the citing reference. We note that 53% of the 
observations in the first-tier database that have positive citing 
references are district court opinions.142 Assuming a random, or at 
 
dispositions—that is, approximately 89%—during the ten-year period beginning on July 1, 1996, 
and ending on June 30, 2006. Id. 
 141. For the details of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.4. 
 142. The first-tier database contained 202 observations in which a federal court positively 
cited to the opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court. In conducting our bivariate analyses, 
we exclude extreme outliers (i.e., those observations involving extreme values in the tails of the 
distribution of the positive citing reference data). We define an extreme outlier to be any 
observation with a total number of positive citations that falls above the third quartile of the 
positive citing reference data (7 citations) by more than three times the interquartile range for 
such data (5 citations). See infra Appendix tbl.3 (describing distribution of positive citing 
references to first-tier opinions). Accordingly, we excluded any observations with more than 22 
positive citing references. Pursuant to this measure, we eliminated 2 observations from our 
analysis—both BAP opinions—leaving us with a total of 200 observations for analysis. 
Accordingly, approximately 99% of the first-tier appellate opinions in our sample that were cited 
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least somewhat random, distribution of issues and factual settings, we 
would expect citation rates to favor district court opinions slightly.143 
Our data, however, generally show that citation rates favor BAP 
opinions. Specifically, we find strong differences between the BAP and 
district court samples that are statistically significant at both the 
mean and the median. For example, a BAP opinion that was positively 
cited had, on average, approximately 7 citations by other federal 
courts, whereas a district court opinion averaged approximately 3 
citations. Furthermore, by disaggregating our citation data according 
to the type of federal court that cited the first-tier appellate opinion, 
we find that the BAP opinions in our study had a statistically 
significantly greater number of citing references by courts of appeals, 
BAPs, and bankruptcy courts than did district court opinions. On the 
other hand, district court opinions had a statistically significantly 
greater number of citing references by other district courts than did 
BAP opinions. Finally, the data indicate that extracircuit federal 
courts cited more to BAP opinions than to district court opinions and 
that the difference is statistically significant. Some of these results are 
illustrated below in Figure 2.144 
 
 
positively by other federal courts are included in our bivariate analyses of the citing reference 
data. 
 143. Cf. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note 104, at 403 (arguing that the 
larger number of citations by the California Supreme Court to opinions issued by the courts of 
New York State may be due to the large case literature arising out of New York). 
 144. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
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FIGURE 2 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY CITING REFERENCE TYPE 
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Additional evidence of the perceived correctness of the first-tier 
appellate opinions can be gleaned from examining the depth of 
treatment provided to those opinions by the federal courts that cited to 
them. Hypothesis 8 predicts that the citing references to BAP opinions 
will have afforded a greater depth of treatment than district court 
opinions. Our data generally support this hypothesis. We find that, at 
both the median and the mean, BAP opinions had a statistically 
significant higher number of citing references by other federal courts 
that cited (i.e., provided discussion of less than a paragraph) and 
discussed (i.e., provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less 
than a printed page) the opinion.145 We also find that, at the median, 
BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of citing 
references by other federal courts that mentioned the opinion (i.e., 
contained a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string 
 
 145. For purposes of this analysis, we once again exclude extreme outliers according to the 
criteria discussed in supra note 142. 
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citation). We do not find, however, either at the median or the mean, 
any association between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and the 
number of positive citing references that examine the opinion (i.e., 
contain an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than 
a printed page of text). Figure 3 illustrates some of these results.146 
 
FIGURE 3 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY DEPTH OF TREATMENT 
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We tracked the number of citing references that directly quoted 
the first-tier appellate opinion as yet another metric for evaluating the 
perceived correctness of the first-tier appellate opinions in our study. 
First, we find evidence to support our hypothesis that a greater 
likelihood exists that positive federal citing references will have 
quoted BAP opinions as opposed to district court opinions. 
Approximately 65% of the federal courts that positively cited BAP 
opinions also directly quoted those opinions, whereas only 38% of 
district court opinions with positive federal citing references were 
directly quoted. If no relationship existed between the type of first-tier 
 
 146. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
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appellate opinion and positive direct quotation thereto by other federal 
courts, we would have expected to see slightly more than half (51%) of 
the first-tier appellate opinions to have been quoted directly. Our 
analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.0001 probability that 
random chance alone would have yielded a difference as large as this, 
thus indicating a statistically significant association between the type 
of first-tier appellate opinion and a federal court’s decision to quote 
the opinion directly when positively citing to it. Furthermore, we 
observe that, on average, approximately 1.5 of the positive citing 
references to BAP opinions directly quote such opinions as opposed to 
only 0.58 of the positive citing references to district court opinions. 
Also, whereas 65% of the positively cited BAP opinions have at least 
one directly quoting citing reference, only 39% of the positively cited 
district court opinions did so. These differences are highly statistically 
significant and further support our contention that positive federal 
citing references will have directly quoted BAP opinions more 
frequently than district court opinions.147 
Finally, the immediacy with which a federal court cites to such 
an opinion serves as yet another indicator of its perceived quality. 
Accordingly, we consider the period of time for which it took a first-tier 
appellate opinion to be positively cited by a federal court for the first 
time.148 Our data show that, for the group of positively cited first-tier 
appellate opinions, a BAP opinion would receive its first positive citing 
reference by another federal court, on average, within approximately 
10 months (306 days), while it took nearly twice as long—
approximately 17 months (533 days)—for a district court opinion. 
Moreover, slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions from this 
group received their first positive citation within approximately a 6-
month period. This starkly contrasts with district court opinions, only 
about a quarter (24%) of which received their first positive citation 
within the same period of time. These highly statistically significant 
differences indicate that the type of first-tier appellate opinion has 
 
 147. For purposes of these analyses, we excluded extreme outliers according to the criteria 
discussed in supra note 142. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
 148. We might assume that an opinion that comprehensively and effectively addresses an 
unresolved or debated issue of law that has been repeatedly litigated not only will be heavily 
cited, but also will be cited more quickly. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we exclude the 
extreme outliers we identified with respect to total number of positive citing references. See 
supra note 142. We further sought to identify whether there were any extreme outliers in terms 
of the number of days it took for the first-tier appellate opinions to be cited. In this instance, we 
define an extreme outlier to be any observation with a total number of days that falls above the 
third quartile of the immediacy data (638 days) by more than 3 times the interquartile range for 
such data (520.5 days). On the basis of these parameters, there were no additional extreme 
outliers. 
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some association with the time within which the opinion will garner 
its first positive citation by another federal court.149 
In summary, based on the affirmance rates of courts of appeals 
on subsequent review of BAP and district court opinions, we find that 
courts of appeals perceive BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate 
review than district courts. Moreover, based on citations to the 
opinions issued by BAPs and district courts, we find strong evidence 
that most nonreviewing federal courts perceive the quality of BAP 
opinions to be better. We now look to confirm whether these 
associations will persist when controlling for other potential 
explanatory variables and, if so, we attempt to measure the strength 
of such associations. 
C. Regression Analyses 
Here, we seek to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the 
perceived quality of appellate review by constructing a series of 
regression models that will test whether the statistically significant 
relationships we identified in Part III.B persist when controlling for 
the independent variables discussed in Part III.A. 
1. Circuit Court Affirmance 
For the 237 observations in the affirmance database,150 we used 
a logistic regression model to predict the binary dependent variable of 
circuit court affirmance (no affirmance coded 0 and affirmance coded 
1), both broadly and narrowly defined (respectively, Affirmance and 
Full Affirmance),151 based on the following independent variables: 
whether the first-tier appellate court was a district court (coded 
0) or a BAP (coded 1) (Court); 
whether the appeal arose within the context of an adversary 
proceeding (coded 0) or a contested matter (coded 1) (Dispute 
Type); 
the fiscal year in which the first-tier appellate court issued its 
opinion (for which we created three indicator variables with the 
response categories 0 for those opinions issued outside of the 
 
 149. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
 150. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135. 
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fiscal year in question and 1 for those opinions issued during the 
fiscal year in question) (Fiscal Year);152 
whether the first-tier appellate court had published its 
disposition (negative responses coded 0 and positive responses 
coded 1) (Published); 
whether the only party to appeal to the first-tier level court was 
the debtor (negative responses coded 0 and positive responses 
coded 1) (Appellant); 
whether the debtor was the only party appearing as an appellee 
at the first-tier level of review (negative responses coded 0 and 
positive responses coded 1) (Appellee); 
whether the appeal arose in the context of a Chapter 7 case 
(negative responses coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) 
(Chapter 7); 
whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was 
that of an individual debtor (negative responses coded 0 and 
positive responses coded 1) (Debtor Type); and 
whether the subject of the appeal could be classified as falling 
into one of the four most frequently occurring subjects of appeal 
heard by first-tier appellate courts for which there was 
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals (negative responses 
coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) (Subject).153 
According to the model, even when controlling for other 
potential explanatory variables, the type of first-tier appellate court to 
have initially determined the appeal remains a statistically significant 
predictor of Affirmance and Full Affirmance by the court of appeals.154 
The model indicates that the shift from the district court to the BAP 
as the first-tier appellate court made the odds of Affirmance 3.95 
[1.41, 11.07] times higher and the odds of Full Affirmance 2.54 [1.12, 
 
 152. The opinions in the database were issued during one of three government fiscal years—
1998, 1999, or 2000. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The reference category was first-
tier opinions issued during the 2000 fiscal year and was accordingly excluded from the model. 
 153. The four most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge (24%), 
multiple subjects (17%), avoiding powers (10%), and procedure/jurisdiction (9%). 
 154. Both the Court and Published variables are significant predictors of Affirmance and 
Full Affirmance. The Appellant, Appellee, and Subject variables are significant predictors of Full 
Affirmance (but not Affirmance). For detailed results from this regression model, see infra 
Appendix tbl.6. 
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5.74] times higher.155 Put another way, holding all other variables 
constant, a first-tier appellate disposition rendered by a BAP 
increased the odds of Affirmance by 295% [41, 1007] and Full 
Affirmance by 154% [12, 474]. 
It is helpful to elucidate these findings in terms of predicted 
probabilities. Using the actual values of all of the independent 
variables included in the model, we can calculate the predicted 
probability of circuit court affirmance for the 237 first-tier appellate 
dispositions upon which the model is based. In Figures 4 and 5 below, 
we present the predicted probabilities for Affirmance and Full 
Affirmance, respectively, of the actual observations in our regression 
model through use of a histogram that displays the distribution of 
those probabilities for district court dispositions and BAP dispositions 
separately. The width of each bar represents a specific interval of 
predicted probability of affirmance, and the height of each bar 
represents the percentage of dispositions that fall within that interval. 
For any observation with a predicted probability of over 50% (i.e., 
greater than 0.5), the model assigned the positive outcome of circuit 
court affirmance. 
 
 155. When performing inference, we implement the recommended practice of conveying 
levels of uncertainty by using the notation [#, #] to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the 
95% confidence interval around our estimates. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew 
M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1835–37 (2006). 
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FIGURE 4 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR AFFIRMANCE 
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First, we find that, when holding other variables at their mean, 
a BAP disposition is predicted to have a 93% [86, 99] chance of being 
either partly or fully affirmed by the court of appeals in contrast to 
77% [70, 84] for district court dispositions. Thus, when holding other 
variables at their mean, the likelihood of partial or full affirmance by 
the court of appeals is predicted to increase by 16 [7, 25] percentage 
points when it reviews BAP dispositions. Second, we find that, when 
holding other variables at their mean, a BAP disposition is predicted 
to have an 85% [76, 95] chance of being fully affirmed by the court of 
appeals in contrast to 69% [62, 77] for district court dispositions. Thus, 
when holding other variables at their mean, the likelihood of full 
affirmance by the court of appeals is similarly predicted to increase by 
16 [4, 28] percentage points when it reviews BAP dispositions. These 
findings support our hypothesis that courts of appeals will more likely 
uphold the dispositions rendered by BAPs than those rendered by 
district courts. 
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FIGURE 5 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR FULL AFFIRMANCE 
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2. Positive Citing References by Other Federal Courts 
To further explore (1) the decision of federal courts to cite 
positively to the opinions issued by first-tier appellate courts, (2) the 
extent to which they do so, (3) the manner in which they do so, and (4) 
the immediacy with which they do so, we construct a series of binary 
logistic regression models as well as various count regression models 
(e.g., negative binomial and Poisson). First, we examine whether the 
association between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and 
positive citation to its opinion persists when controlling for other 
factors. For all 286 observations in the first-tier database, we use a 
binary logistic regression model to predict whether a federal court will 
have cited positively to the first-tier appellate opinion (coding opinions 
with no positive citations as 0 and coding opinions with at least one 
positive citation as 1) based on the following independent variables: 
(1) Court; (2) whether the first-tier appellate court fully affirmed the 
disposition rendered by the bankruptcy court (negative responses 
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coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) (First-Tier Full Affirmance); 
(3) Published; (4) Appellant; (5) Appellee; (6) Chapter 7; (7) Debtor 
Type; (8) Dispute Type; (9) Subject; (10) whether the first-tier court’s 
disposition was subsequently appealed to the court of appeals 
(negative responses coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) 
(Subsequent Appeal); and (11) Fiscal Year. 
The model identifies the type of first-tier appellate court to 
have initially determined the appeal as a statistically significant 
predictor of whether the court’s opinion will have been positively cited 
by another federal court.156 Figure 6 below illustrates the predicted 
probability of positive citation to the first-tier appellate opinion based 
on the actual values of all of the independent variables included in the 
model. 
 
FIGURE 6 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR POSITIVE CITATION OF 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS 
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 156. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.7. 
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We find that, when holding other variables at their mean, a 
BAP opinion is predicted to have a 90% [84, 97] chance of being 
positively cited by another federal court in contrast to 73% [65, 81] for 
district court opinions. Accordingly, when holding other variables at 
their mean, the likelihood of positive citation to a first-tier appellate 
opinion by another federal court is predicted to increase by 17 [7, 27] 
percentage points for BAP opinions. These data support our 
hypothesis that, if a BAP issued the first-tier appellate opinion, it will 
increase the chances of the opinion being positively cited by other 
federal courts.157 
The question arises whether this association persists when 
analyzing the extent to which other federal courts cite to first-tier 
appellate opinions, whether analyzing citations in the aggregate (i.e., 
total number of positive citations) or disaggregated according to the 
type of citing federal court. To answer the question, we implement a 
variety of count regression models that analyze the 200 observations 
in the first-tier database where a federal court positively cited to the 
opinion issued by the BAP or district court.158 First, in order to predict 
the aggregate number of positive citations, we conduct a zero-
truncated negative binomial regression analysis.159 We then proceed to 
analyze the number of positive citations by citing court type pursuant 
to a negative binomial regression model (with one exception).160 For 
both of these models, we incorporate the same independent variables 
from the binary logistic regression model used to predict whether the 
first-tier appellate opinion would be cited. Figures 7 and 8 compare (1) 
the observed probabilities for each value of the number of positive 
citations to the first-tier appellate opinions from the first-tier database 
with (2) the average predicted probabilities of observing those specific 
 
 157. The model also identifies the Published, Dispute, and Subject variables as significant 
predictors of whether the first-tier appellate opinion will have been cited by other federal courts. 
 158. There were actually 202 such observations. For purposes of our regression analyses, 
however, we eliminated 2 extreme outliers, which left 200 observations to be analyzed. See supra 
note 142. 
 159. A zero-truncated negative binomial regression model is appropriate here since (1) the 
aggregate number of positive citations is a count variable that is overdispersed, and (2) there are 
no zero values for this subset of observations (i.e., all opinions have at least one positive citing 
reference). 
 160. We ran the regression model four times to account for four different types of citing 
federal courts (i.e., bankruptcy court, district court, BAP, and extracircuit federal courts). In 
order to predict the number of citing references by courts of appeals, however, we used a Poisson 
regression model. When fitting a negative binomial regression model, the likelihood ratio test for 
alpha—the overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chi-squared = 2.52, df = 1, p = 0.056), 
thus indicating that the Poisson model is preferred. We do not use a zero-truncated model for 
any of these dependent variables since some of the observations do have zero values. 
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counts based on the actual values of all of the independent variables 
included in the fitted models. 
The models indicate that a statistically significant relationship 
exists between the type of first-tier appellate court that issued the 
opinion and the total number of positive citing references as well as 
positive citing references by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, district courts, 
courts of appeals, and extracircuit federal courts. A BAP opinion 
increased the expected number of total positive citations over a five-
year period by approximately 154% [84, 251], holding all other 
variables constant. If we focus on the type of citing federal court, 
holding all other variables at their mean, BAP opinions are predicted 
to receive approximately (1) 2.0 [1.1, 3.0] more bankruptcy court 
citations; (2) 1.3 [0.8, 1.7] more BAP citations; (3) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] more 
court of appeals citations; and (4) 0.6 [0.04, 1.2] more citations by 
extracircuit federal courts. 
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FIGURE 7 
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED COUNTS OF 
POSITIVE CITATION TO FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS 
BY ALL FEDERAL COURTS AND EXTRACIRCUIT FEDERAL COURTS 
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FIGURE 8 
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED COUNTS OF POSITIVE 
CITATION TO FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY TYPE OF CITING FEDERAL COURT 
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These results support Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7. We also 
find that, holding all other variables at their mean, district court 
opinions are predicted to receive approximately 0.34 [0.03, 0.65] more 
district court citations than BAP opinions, thus confirming the 
distinction we drew in Hypothesis 6.161 Overall, the bulk of our 
evidence suggests that other actors within the bankruptcy judicial 
system perceived BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review 
than district courts.162 
 
 161. To predict the total number of positive district court citations to first-tier appellate 
opinions, we initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that included all of the 
independent variables in the negative binomial regression model used for the other types of 
citations (the full model). Although the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor in 
the full model, the model as a whole was not statistically significant (chi-squared = 19.21, df = 
12, p = 0.0836). Accordingly, using a backward-selection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial 
model that only included the Court, Debtor, Subject, and Fiscal Year variables. This partial 
model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 16.70, df = 5, p = 0.0051), and the Court 
variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.032). 
 162. For detailed results from these regression models, see infra Appendix tbl.8. 
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Using the same negative binomial regression model we used to 
predict the extent to which federal courts would cite to the first-tier 
appellate opinions, we find limited results for whether the type of 
first-tier appellate opinion will be a statistically significant predictor 
of the depth of treatment provided to the opinion by the citing federal 
court when controlling for other factors.163 Again, when holding all 
other variables at their mean, we find that BAP opinions are predicted 
to have a statistically significant higher number of citing references by 
other federal courts that (1) provided discussion of less than a 
paragraph but more than a brief reference to the cited opinion—
approximately 2.96 [1.99, 3.92] more citing references of this type—
and (2) provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less than a 
printed page of the opinion—approximately 0.39 [0.09, 0.68] more 
citing references of this type.164 On the other hand, we find no 
statistically significant relationship between the type of first-tier 
appellate court that issued the opinion and the number of citing 
references that either mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief 
reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation) or examined 
the opinion (i.e., contained an extended discussion of the cited opinion 
usually more than a printed page of text).165 
Including the same observations and independent variables 
from the regression models we used to predict the extent of citation 
and depth of treatment by citing references, we predict through binary 
logistic regression the tendency of first-tier appellate opinions to be 
directly quoted by federal courts that positively cite to those opinions. 
We find that, when holding other variables at their mean, a BAP 
opinion is predicted to have a 64% [53, 75] chance of being directly 
 
 163. In one instance, we do not use a negative binomial regression model. In order to predict 
the number of citing references that examined the first-tier appellate opinion (i.e., an opinion 
that contains an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of 
text), we used a Poisson regression model since the values for this dependent variable were not 
overdispersed. When using a negative binomial model, the likelihood ratio test for alpha—the 
overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chi-squared = 0.0019, df = 1, p = 0.483), thus 
indicating that the Poisson model is preferred. 
 164. To predict the total number of positive citations that provided discussion of more than a 
paragraph but less than a printed page of the opinion, we initially fitted a negative binomial 
regression model that included all of the independent variables included in the negative binomial 
regression model used for the other types of citations (the full model). Although the Court 
variable was a statistically significant predictor in the full model, the model as a whole was not 
statistically significant (chi-squared = 15.41, df = 12, p = 0.2200). Accordingly, using a backward-
selection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only included the Court and Subject 
variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 9.67, df = 2, p = 0.0080), 
and the Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.008). 
 165. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9. 
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quoted in contrast to 40% [29, 50] for a district court opinion.166 Thus, 
when holding other variables at their mean, the likelihood of direct 
quotation of a first-tier appellate opinion by a citing federal court is 
predicted to increase by 25 [9, 40] percentage points when the court 
cites to a BAP opinion. We present the distribution of predicted 
probabilities for direct quotation (based on the actual values of all of 
the independent variables included in the model) in Figure 9 below. 
FIGURE 9 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR DIRECT QUOTATION OF 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY CITING FEDERAL COURTS 
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Moreover, if we look to the extent of direct quotation of first-
tier appellate opinions, a negative binomial regression model indicates 
that a statistically significant relationship exists between the type of 
first-tier appellate court to have issued the opinion and the extent to 
 
 166. None of the other independent variables was a statistically significant predictor of 
direct quotation of the first-tier appellate opinion by its citing reference. For detailed results 
from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.11. 
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which other federal courts directly quoted the opinion.167 Specifically, 
we find that, holding all other variables at their mean, a BAP opinion 
is predicted to have approximately 0.75 [0.35, 1.16] more citing 
references that directly quote it than a district court opinion.168 These 
findings support Hypotheses 9A and 9B. 
Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 10, even when 
controlling for other factors. A zero-truncated negative binomial 
regression model indicates that the type of first-tier appellate court to 
have issued the opinion influenced the immediacy with which it was 
cited. A BAP opinion is predicted to decrease the expected number of 
days before a federal court first cites positively to a first-tier appellate 
opinion by approximately 44% [25, 58], holding all other variables 
constant. It would seem, therefore, that BAP opinions command the 
attention of other federal courts more quickly than district court 
opinions.169 
D. Interpretation of Results 
Our inquiry into the perceived quality of appellate review has 
focused on two types of perception: (1) the manner in which courts of 
appeals, upon direct review, have perceived BAPs and district courts 
to perform their error-finding function; and (2) the manner in which 
other federal courts have signaled, through citation practices, their 
perception of the quality of appellate review provided by BAPs and 
district courts. We conducted our inquiry by testing a series of 
hypotheses predicting that BAPs, by virtue of their structural 
features, would be perceived to provide a quality of appellate review 
superior to that of their district court counterparts. In the end, our 
statistical analyses generate considerable evidence in support of our 
hypotheses. We repeatedly find a statistically significant, positive 
association between BAPs and various measures for the perception of 
the quality of appellate review. However, as statistical significance 
does not necessarily translate into substantive significance, we seek to 
give a richer account of the different ways in which our results 
buttress our claims. 
 
 167. The model incorporates the same independent variables and observations from the 
binary logistic regression model used to predict the tendency for direct quotation of first-tier 
appellate opinions. 
 168. No statistically significant relationship existed between any of the other independent 
variables and the number of citations that directly quoted the first-tier appellate opinion. For 
detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9. 
 169. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.10. 
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First, consider our findings that, even when holding other 
variables at their mean, the likelihood of some affirmance (whether in 
part or in full) by the court of appeals is predicted to increase from 
77% for district courts to 93% for BAPs, and that the likelihood of full 
affirmance by the court of appeals is predicted to increase from 69% 
for district courts to 85% for BAPs.170 Given that affirmance deference 
has been documented to be a major determinant of circuit court 
outcomes,171 the statistically significant difference in affirmance rates 
takes on added significance. While legal procedural requirements 
generally require a court of appeals to accord deference to a lower 
court’s findings of fact, the legal standard most often applicable to a 
lower court’s conclusions of law—de novo review—calls for no such 
deference. If courts of appeals affirm BAPs at a statistically significant 
greater rate than district courts, notwithstanding the affirmance bias 
created by legal review standards, our results suggest that the circuit 
courts perceive the BAP to perform its error-finding function better 
than the district court.172 
Second, consider our statistically significant findings that BAP 
opinions received higher numbers of positive citations by other federal 
 
 170. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 171. See CROSS, supra note 95, at 39–68. 
 172. A study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found that courts of appeals fully 
affirmed the judgments of district courts in bankruptcy appeals approximately 73% of the time, 
and the study further estimated that the affirmance rates for BAP judgments would be similar. 
See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 630. We conclude that our statistically significant 
evidence contravenes the prior understanding of outcomes in the bankruptcy appeals system. 
 In response to the account we have provided regarding circuit court affirmance, one might 
argue that courts of appeals simply prefer to reduce their workload and that they accordingly 
tend to defer to BAPs (even if the legal standard calls for more exacting review). Assuming, 
however, that the predilection toward leisure does not outweigh the desire of courts of appeals to 
resolve appeals correctly, then one must assume that, to the extent that courts of appeals 
affirm—and, on this story, defer to—BAPs more than district courts, they do so because they 
believe that BAPs are structurally more likely to resolve the issues correctly than are district 
courts. It is true that, to the extent that the courts of appeals simply defer to BAPs to a greater 
extent on principle (i.e., with less review of how the BAPs actually resolve particular cases), we 
cannot say whether the affirmance rate measures actual quality of appellate review. Even on 
this story, however, the affirmance rate does measure the perceived quality of appellate review. 
 One also might argue that courts of appeals in BAP circuits are heavily invested in the 
success of the BAPs given that the judicial councils in those circuits have decided to establish 
BAPs in the first instance, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2000) (setting forth procedures for 
establishing a BAP), and given that the judicial councils have also selected the bankruptcy 
judges who will serve on the BAPs, see id. § 158(b)(3) (setting forth procedures for selecting BAP 
judges). The desire to legitimate the BAP as an institution, in other words, may motivate the 
greater tendency of courts of appeals to affirm BAPs. Insofar as review by a court of appeals is 
transparent, however, it is unlikely that the court would simply affirm BAP judgments and 
reasoning that were obviously wrong. Put another way, it seems unlikely that the desire of a 
court of appeals to legitimate a BAP would entirely outweigh the desire to resolve appeals 
correctly. 
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courts, BAP opinions were cited in greater depth, and BAP opinions 
were cited with greater immediacy. We noted above that citations 
rates are most relevant and most informative in the absence of a stare 
decisis obligation.173 Accordingly, we find that our results regarding 
the citation practices of courts of appeals and extracircuit federal 
courts merit particular attention. 
At first blush, one might not consider substantively significant 
our statistically significant finding that, when holding other variables 
at their mean, BAP opinions are predicted to receive approximately 
0.2 more citations by courts of appeals. Placed in its proper context, 
however, this finding takes on new light. As an initial matter, courts 
of appeals were incredibly parsimonious in their citing of first-tier 
appellate opinions. Specifically, 82% of the first-tier appellate opinions 
did not receive any circuit court citations, thus making any amount of 
citation by the courts of appeals impressive. Furthermore, we estimate 
pursuant to our regression analysis that the rate of citation over a 
five-year period to BAP opinions by courts of appeals is 2.33 [1.30, 
4.21] times greater than for district court opinions.174 These findings 
confirm anecdotal evidence reported by the Federal Judicial Center 
that circuit judges perceive BAP opinions to be of a higher quality 
than district court opinions.175 Thus, although the size of the 
statistically significant effect we witness with respect to circuit court 
citations appears small, we interpret it to have substantive 
significance. Finally, we uncovered statistically significant evidence to 
support our hypothesis that extracircuit federal courts would 
positively cite with greater frequency to BAP opinions—specifically, a 
rate predicted to be 1.45 [1.03, 2.03] times greater than that for 
district court opinions.176 In light of “the dearth of binding precedent 
[on questions of substantive bankruptcy law] from the courts of 
appeals or the Supreme Court,”177 one might interpret the extracircuit 
favoritism of BAP opinions over district court opinions as the next-
best source of authority. 
When we consider these findings in concert with the rest of our 
findings on citation practices, we conclude that there exists strong 
support for the notion that, in a variety of ways, other judicial actors 
 
 173. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra Appendix tbl.8. 
 175. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 678 (“There is anecdotal evidence that 
circuit judges find the BAP decisions they review better reasoned and the cases better prepared 
for review than decisions from the district courts, and that this impression is independent of the 
likelihood of affirmance or reversal.” (emphasis added)). 
 176. See infra Appendix tbl.8. 
 177. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 628. 
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in the bankruptcy appeals process perceive BAPs to provide a better 
quality of appellate review than district courts. These conclusions 
provide strong validation to commentators who have theorized about 
the ideal attributes of appellate review. To the extent that courts in 
fact strive to resolve cases correctly, the findings suggest that BAPs in 
fact offer higher quality appellate review than do district courts. That 
conclusion, in turn, has important ramifications for policymakers. It 
would seem desirable for policymakers to introduce more 
multimember appellate tribunals staffed by judges with particular 
expertise in the subject matter of the appeals.178 
It is important to emphasize again that those conclusions 
clearly result only if courts in fact strive to reach correct resolution of 
cases and issues. That is a question on which our data do not and 
cannot shed light. It may be the case that, partly as a result of 
theoreticians’ writings, courts favor BAPs over district courts not 
because they truly conclude that BAPs are correct more often, but 
rather because they simply believe (without truly examining) that 
BAPs are correct, which in turn inclines them simply to affirm the 
conclusions of BAPs. If so, the lesson for policymakers is murkier. 
 
 178. See, e.g., id. at 634:  
[U]sers of the complex bankruptcy system probably want precedent not just 
settled, but settled right . . . . If early (and in the Ninth Circuit, not so early) 
impressions about the quality of work by the bankruptcy appellate panels 
hold up, the dual needs for binding authority and substantive correctness . . . 
argue for some sort of a dual or hybrid system involving bankruptcy appellate 
panels in some form. 
 The benefits of establishing such tribunals may impose various costs, although they may be 
minimized depending on the manner in which such tribunals are integrated within existing 
judicial operations. See, e.g., id. at 629; Bankruptcy Appeals, Lawyers Wary of New System Begun 
This Month, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1996, at 5 (“Steven Flanders, the Second Circuit Executive, 
though, while noting that the BAPs represent a ‘major institutional change’ for the circuit, 
believes the costs will be manageable. Mr. Flanders indicated that the calendaring of appeals 
will be integrated into the circuit clerk’s office . . . .”). From the perspective of litigants, a cost of 
particular concern would be that of disposition time. In the bankruptcy appeals context, however, 
preliminary evidence tentatively suggests that BAPs appear to have reduced such costs. A study 
by the Federal Judicial Center reported that, “[i]n most circuits, the overall mean and median 
disposition times for BAPs are lower than the national figure for bankruptcy appeals to the 
district courts, but in most circuits they are based on a rather small number of cases, which 
limits the conclusions to be drawn from the figures.” McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 661. 
 We emphasize that our findings do not speak to whether it is more desirable to have many 
such tribunals—as is the case with BAPs—or just one national tribunal—as is the case, for 
example, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for patent appeals. 
That issue would seem to turn largely on the importance of having an intermediate appellate 
tribunal announce legal rules with national uniformity. See, e.g., id. at 649.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have shown that, in different ways, federal 
courts have expressed a general preference for the quality of appellate 
review afforded by BAPs as opposed to district courts. On the hardly 
implausible assumption that courts in fact strive to resolve cases and 
issues correctly, this finding tends to validate theoreticians’ claims 
about the ideal attributes of appellate review, because BAPs, more so 
than district courts, tend to feature those attributes. Upon the same 
assumption, this finding also should prompt policymakers to introduce 
more appellate tribunals with these attributes—specifically, 
multimember panels whose members enjoy an expertise in the types 
of matters likely to fill up the docket of the tribunals. 
We believe that future research in the area will offer even more 
insights. We intend to continue our exploration by refining our 
consideration of issues that come before courts. Perhaps, for example, 
some issues lend themselves more to solution by expert panels than do 
others. We also hope to consider the effect of competition between 
appellate tribunals, such as the one that exists between BAPs and 
district courts in the bankruptcy appeals context. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Sample of Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions 
Panel A: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) Opinions by Fiscal 
Year 
Fiscal 
Year 
District Court 
Opinions 
Column 
Percentage 
BAP 
Opinions 
Column 
Percentage 
1998 56  34.57 34  32.08 
1999 53  32.72 44  41.51 
2000 53  32.72 28  26.42 
Total 162 100.00 106 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
 
Panel B: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions by Circuit 
Circuit District 
Court 
Column 
Percentage 
BAP Column 
Percentage 
Total Column 
Percentage 
First 7 4.32 10 9.43 17 6.34 
Second 32 19.75 5 4.72 37 13.81 
Third 26 16.05 0 0.00 26 9.70 
Fourth 9 5.56 0 0.00 9 3.36 
Fifth 14 8.64 0 0.00 14 5.22 
Sixth 16 9.88 11 10.38 27 10.07 
Seventh 23 14.20 0 0.00 23 8.58 
Eighth 2 1.23 22 20.75 24 8.96 
Ninth 14 8.64 31 29.25 45 16.79 
Tenth 7 4.32 27 25.47 34 12.69 
Eleventh 12 7.41 0 0.00 12 4.48 
District of 
Columbia 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 162 100.0 106 100.00 268 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
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Panel C: Court of Appeals Opinions by Fiscal Year and First-Tier Court Reviewed 
Fiscal 
Year 
Reviewing District 
Court  
Column 
Percentage 
Reviewing 
BAP  
Column 
Percentage 
1998 42  30.66 13  39.39 
1999 44  32.12 9  27.27 
2000 51  37.23 11  33.33 
Total 137 100.00 33 100.00 
Source: Second-Tier Database 
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
 
Panel D: Court of Appeals Opinions by Circuit and First-Tier Court Reviewed 
Circuit District 
Court 
Column 
Percentage 
BAP Column 
Percentage 
Total Column 
Percentage 
First 3 2.19 3 9.09 6 3.53 
Second 14 10.22 2 6.06 16 9.41 
Third 7 5.11 0 0.00 7 4.12 
Fourth 8 5.84 0 0.00 8 4.71 
Fifth 23 16.79 0 0.00 23 13.53 
Sixth 15 10.95 2 6.06 17 10.00 
Seventh 16 11.68 0 0.00 16 9.41 
Eighth 10 7.30 2 6.06 12 7.06 
Ninth 26 18.98 23 69.70 49 28.82 
Tenth 8 5.84 1 3.03 9 5.29 
Eleventh 6 4.38 0 0.00 6 3.53 
District of 
Columbia 
1 0.73 0 0.00 1 0.59 
Total 137 100.00 33 100.00 170 100.00 
Source: Second-Tier Database 
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. 
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Table 2: Frequency of Dispositions Rendered on Appeal 
 
Panel A: First-Tier Dispositions 
Disposition Frequency Percentage 
Negative 78 29.10 
Hybrid 22 8.21 
Positive 168 62.69 
Total 268 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database 
 
Panel B: Second-Tier Dispositions 
Disposition Frequency Percentage 
Negative 33 19.41 
Hybrid 17 10.00 
Positive 120 70.59 
Total 170 100.00 
Source: Second-Tier Database 
 
Table 3: Data for First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions with Positive Citing 
References 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Positive Citation to First-Tier Appellate Opinions 
Number of 
Citations 
Frequency Percentage 
1 45 22.28 
2 35 17.33 
3 24 11.88 
4 17  8.42 
5 18  8.91 
≥ 6 63 31.18 
Total 202 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database 
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Panel B: Distribution of Positive Citations to First-Tier Appellate Opinions 
N 25% Median 75% Mean 
202 1 2 5 4 
Source: First-Tier Database 
 
Table 4: Circuit Court Affirmance of First-Tier Appellate Dispositions 
 
Panel A: Partial or Full Affirmance 
 Circuit Court Affirmance 
First-Tier Appellate Court No Yes Total 
BAP 5
(8.77) 
52
(91.23) 
57 
(100.00) 
District Court 47
(26.11) 
133
(73.89) 
180 
(100.00) 
Total 52
(21.94) 
185
(78.06) 
237 
(100.00) 
Source: Affirmance Database 
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test 
with one degree of freedom is 0.006. 
 
Panel B: Full Affirmance 
 Circuit Court Affirmance 
First-Tier Appellate Court No Yes Total 
BAP 11
(19.30) 
46
(80.70) 
57 
(100.00) 
District Court 61
(33.89) 
119
(66.11) 
180 
(100.00) 
Total 72
(30.38) 
165
(69.62) 
237 
(100.00) 
Source: Affirmance Database 
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test 
with one degree of freedom is 0.037. 
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Table 5: Citing Reference Data 
 
Panel A: Federal Court Positive Citing Reference by Type of First-Tier Appellate 
Opinion 
 Positive Citing Reference by Federal Court 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion 
Type 
No Yes Total 
BAP 10
(9.43) 
96
(90.57) 
106 
(100.00) 
District Court 56
(34.57) 
106
(65.43) 
162 
(100.00) 
Total 66
(24.63) 
202
(75.37) 
268 
(100.00) 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test 
with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001. 
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Panel B: Citing Reference Data by Type of Citing Court for Positively Cited First-
Tier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
Citing Court: All Federal Courts Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 6.00 7.27 94 
District Court Opinions 2.00 3.25 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -6.5107 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -6.257 (p < 0.0001)*** 
   
Citing Court: Court of Appeals Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.45 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.19 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -2.7414 (p = 0.0067)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.560 (p = 0.0105)* 
Citing Court: Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 2.01 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.15 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -9.7270 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -9.368 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Citing Court: District Court Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.57 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 0.99 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 2.0821 (p = 0.0386)* 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 3.194 (p = 0.0014)** 
Citing Court: Bankruptcy Court Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 3.00 4.23 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.92 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -5.2142 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.593 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Citing Court: Extracircuit Federal Courts Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.50 2.52 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.51 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -3.0581 (p = 0.0025)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -3.337 (p = 0.0008)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Panel C: Citing Reference Data by Depth of Treatment for Positively Cited First-
Tier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
Depth of Treatment: Mentioned Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 1.10 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.73 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -1.8837 (p = 0.0611) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.288 (p = 0.0221)* 
   
    
Depth of Treatment: Cited Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 4.50 5.22 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.94 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -7.3435 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -6.941 (p < 0.0001)*** 
    
Depth of Treatment: Discussed Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.89 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.48 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -2.8311 (p = 0.0051)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.349 (p = 0.0188)* 
    
Depth of Treatment: Examined Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.05 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.09 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 1.0285 (p = 0.3050) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.889 (p = 0.3741) 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Panel D: Federal Court Positive Quoting References by Type of First-Tier Appellate 
Opinion 
 Positive Quoting Reference by Federal Court 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type No Yes Total 
BAP 33
(35.11) 
61
(64.89) 
94 
(100.00) 
District Court 65
(61.32) 
41
(38.68) 
106 
(100.00) 
Total 98
(49.00) 
102
(51.00) 
200 
(100.00) 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test 
with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001. 
 
Panel E: Citing Reference Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy 
Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 1.43 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.58 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -4.4839 (p < 0.0001)***  
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.473 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Panel F: Immediacy Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy Appellate 
Opinions 
 Number of Days 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 177 306 94 
District Court Opinions 387 533 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 4.0459 (p = 0.0001)***  
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.166 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Circuit Court Affirmance 
Variable Affirmance Full Affirmance 
Court 3.947** (1.407, 11.069) 2.535* (1.119, 5.742) 
Published 0.295** (0.129, 0.673) 0.287*** (0.138, 0.598) 
Appellant 2.003 (0.815, 4.924) 4.293*** (1.886, 9.776) 
Appellee 0.993 (0.434, 2.272) 2.372* (1.072, 5.249) 
Chapter 7 1.594 (0.770, 3.299) 1.683 (0.852, 3.323) 
Debtor Type 1.279 (0.581, 2.812) 0.936 (0.438, 2.000) 
Dispute Type 0.940 (0.431, 2.048) 1.142 (0.544, 2.394) 
Subject 0.596 (0.260, 1.365) 0.452* (0.206, 0.990) 
FY 1998 1.103 (0.485, 2.511) 0.527 (0.247, 1.122) 
FY 1999 0.721 (0.323, 1.611) 0.729 (0.336, 1.582) 
N 237 237 
Log likelihood -110.133 -122.660 
McFadden’s R² 0.117 0.157 
Source: Affirmance Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence 
intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Positive Citation by a Federal 
Court to First-Tier Appellate Opinion 
 
Variable Positive Federal Court Citation 
Court 3.445** (1.515, 7.836) 
First-Tier Full Affirmance 1.459 (0.724, 2.942) 
Published 6.810*** (3.391, 13.673) 
Appellant 0.868 (0.361, 2.086) 
Appellee 1.278 (0.524, 3.118) 
Chapter 7 1.335 (0.644, 2.765) 
Debtor Type 0.783 (0.321, 1.908) 
Dispute Type 2.881* (1.148, 7.231) 
Subject 3.392** (1.379, 8.346) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.937 (0.450, 1.951) 
FY 1998 0.745 (0.336, 1.653) 
FY 1999 1.072 (0.469, 2.452) 
N 268 
Log likelihood -116.625 
McFadden’s R² 0.220 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% 
confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing 
References to Positively Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Type 
of Federal Court) 
Variable All 
Federal 
Court 
Citationsa 
Bankruptcy 
Court 
Citationsb 
District 
Court 
Citationsc 
BAP 
Citationsb 
Court of 
Appeals 
Citationsd 
Extracircuit 
Citationsb 
Court  2.538*** 
(1.836, 
3.509) 
 2.072*** 
(1.509, 2.845) 
 0.628* 
 (0.410, 
0.962) 
 9.702*** 
(5.462, 
17.231) 
 2.336** 
(1.297, 
4.206) 
 1.447* 
(1.030, 2.031) 
First-Tier 
Full 
Affirmance 
 0.995 
(0.732, 
1.352) 
 0.985 
(0.726, 1.337) 
   1.088  
(0.738, 
1.605) 
 0.873 
(0.517, 
1.473) 
 1.000 
(0.716, 1.397) 
Published  1.838** 
(1.128, 
2.994) 
 1.563 
(0.968, 2.526) 
   4.276 
(0.985, 
18.561) 
 3.524 
(0.820, 
15.141) 
 4.814*** 
(2.443, 9.488) 
Appellant  1.020 
(0.685, 
1.519) 
 1.023 
(0.686, 1.527) 
   0.925 
(0.573, 
1.493) 
 1.381 
(0.614, 
3.104) 
 1.055 
(0.681, 1.633) 
Appellee  1.005 
(0.681, 
1.485) 
 1.096 
(0.740, 1.623) 
  0.470** 
(0.275, 
0.802) 
 2.306* 
(1.101, 
4.830) 
1.194 
(0.780, 1.828) 
Chapter 7  1.395* 
(1.011, 
1.924) 
 1.386* 
(1.010, 1.904) 
   1.330 
(0.873, 
2.026) 
 1.629 
(0.901, 
2.948) 
 1.112 
(0.783, 1.581) 
Debtor Type  0.741 
(0.490, 
1.120) 
 0.782 
(0.517, 1.183) 
 0.673 
(0.432, 
1.050) 
 1.475 
(0.803, 
2.709) 
 0.400* 
(0.188, 
0.852) 
 0.800 
(0.512, 1.249) 
Dispute 
Type 
 0.817 
(0.551, 
1.212) 
 0.796 
(0.538, 1.178) 
  1.452 
(0.871, 
2.418) 
 0.678 
(0.326, 
1.413) 
 0.930 
(0.614, 1.408) 
Subject  1.435 
(0.971, 
2.121) 
 1.160 
(0.783, 1.720) 
 1.492 
(0.976, 
2.280) 
 1.870* 
(1.125, 
3.107) 
 1.341 
(0.634, 
2.838) 
 1.202 
(0.797, 1.814) 
Subsequent 
Appeal 
 1.092 
(0.795, 
1.501) 
 1.063 
(0.777, 1.455) 
  1.169 
(0.789, 
1.731) 
 0.949 
(0.536, 
1.682) 
 1.127 
(0.805, 1.579) 
FY 1998  1.134 
(0.778, 
1.652) 
 0.845 
(0.584, 1.223) 
1.687* 
(0.999, 
2.847) 
 1.657* 
(1.018, 
2.697) 
 0.700 
(0.376, 
1.302) 
 0.914 
(0.606, 1.378) 
FY 1999  1.004 
(0.711, 
1.418) 
 0.926 
(0.659, 1.301) 
1.324 
(0.789, 
2.223) 
 1.237 
(0.799, 
1.915) 
 0.447* 
(0.240, 
0.832) 
 0.867 
(0.595, 1.263) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 All 
Federal 
Court 
Citationsa 
Bankruptcy 
Court 
Citationsb 
District 
Court 
Citationsc 
BAP 
Citationsb 
Court of 
Appeals 
Citationsd 
Extracircuit 
Citationsb 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Log 
likelihood 
-473.506 -427.097 -238.131 -209.440 -130.134 -359.980 
McFadden’s 
R² 
0.063 0.050 0.034 0.242 0.124 0.053 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% 
confidence intervals in parentheses. 
a Zero-truncated negative binomial regression model. 
b Negative binomial regression model. 
c We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the 
independent variables in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 161. 
d Poisson regression model. When fitting a negative binomial regression model, the 
likelihood ratio test for alpha—the overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chi-
squared = 2.52, df = 1, p = 0.056), thus indicating that the Poisson model is preferred. 
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Table 9: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing 
References to Positively Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Depth 
of Treatment) 
 
Variable Citeda Discussedb Quoteda 
Court  2.525*** 
(1.922, 3.317) 
 1.798** 
 (1.164, 2.779) 
 2.338*** 
(1.527, 3.580) 
First-Tier Full Affirmance  1.023 
(0.789, 1.325) 
  0.828 
(0.561, 1.222) 
Published  1.521 
(0.997, 2.321) 
  1.535 
(0.771, 3.056) 
Appellant  1.127 
(0.809, 1.569) 
  1.288 
(0.761, 2.179) 
Appellee  1.021 
(0.735, 1.420) 
  1.373 
(0.817, 2.307) 
Chapter 7  1.352* 
(1.027, 1.779) 
  1.302 
(0.853, 1.988) 
Debtor Type  0.766 
(0.541, 1.085) 
  0.663 
(0.388, 1.135) 
Dispute Type  0.853 
(0.608, 1.197) 
  0.913 
(0.549, 1.517) 
Subject  1.174 
(0.839, 1.643) 
 1.397 
(0.882, 2.213) 
 1.059 
(0.645, 1.741) 
Subsequent Appeal  0.915 
(0.699, 1.197) 
  0.676 
(0.438, 1.043) 
FY 1998  1.101 
(0.804, 1.506) 
  1.450 
(0.885, 2.374) 
FY 1999  0.969 
(0.725, 1.296) 
  1.366 
(0.862, 2.163) 
N 200 200 200 
Log likelihood -436.214 -221.011 -257.881 
McFadden’s R² 0.076 0.021 0.060 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% 
confidence intervals in parentheses. We have only presented the results from those 
regression analyses in which the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor. 
a Negative binomial regression model. 
b We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the 
independent variables in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 164. 
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Table 10: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model of Number of Days 
for First Positive Federal Court Citing Reference to Positively Cited First-Tier 
Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions 
Variable Number of Days 
Court 0.565*** (0.423, 0.753) 
First-Tier Full Affirmance 0.913 (0.698, 1.194) 
Published 0.922 (0.631, 1.345) 
Appellant 1.116 (0.781, 1.595) 
Appellee 1.097 (0.761, 1.582) 
Chapter 7 0.767 (0.579, 1.016) 
Debtor Type 0.889 (0.619, 1.275) 
Dispute Type 0.836 (0.596, 1.174) 
Subject 0.670* (0.480, 0.937) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.681* (0.507, 0.914) 
FY 1998 0.860 (0.607, 1.220) 
FY 1999 0.927 (0.676, 1.272) 
N 200 
Log likelihood -1392.339 
McFadden’s R² 0.013 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% 
confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Direct Quotation of Positively Cited 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion by Positive Citing Federal Courts 
 
Variable Direct Quotation 
Court 2.727** (1.393, 5.339) 
First-Tier Full Affirmance 0.563 (0.297, 1.067) 
Published 1.142 (0.455, 2.868) 
Appellant 1.079 (0.473, 2.461) 
Appellee 1.173 (0.514, 2.681) 
Chapter 7 1.083 (0.555, 2.112) 
Debtor Type 1.300 (0.572, 2.954) 
Dispute Type 0.861 (0.381, 1.946) 
Subject 1.050 (0.474, 2.328) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.702 (0.360, 1.370) 
FY 1998 1.079 (0.501, 2.323) 
FY 1999 2.007 (0.964, 4.178) 
N 200 
Log likelihood -126.033 
McFadden’s R² 0.091 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence 
intervals in parentheses. 
 
